A Study On Information Disclosure And Rigid Payment Of Trust Company

With the rapid growth of the overall scale of the industry,the trust industry has become an important part of China's financial system,which exert a significant influence on the stability of the entire financial system.However,there are still some phenomena such as inadequate information disclosure and rigid payment responsibility of trust companies when issuing trust products,which may lead to the accumulation of risks of trust companies and further endanger the stability of the overall financial system.Based on the equilibrium theory of incomplete information dynamic game,this paper demonstrates a trust product investment game model with trust companies and investors as participants and solves the equilibrium results.It is concluded that the current situation that not fully disclosure and rigidly payment are arising from a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium.Thus,without other external interference,trust companies and investors,there will be no incentive to change these situations.On the above basis,suggestions are given to break this situation in order to strengthen the supervision of trust companies so as to enhance the cost of violations of trust companies,improve the level of education of investors so as to enhance the ability of risk identification of investors,and ultimately promote the formation of new balanced results in the market.