Game Theory Research On The Loss Of Internet Trade Trust Under Asymmetric Information

According to the statistics in CNNIC, there is a great increase in the number of Chinese netizens. By the end of 2007, the number of Chinese netizens has reached at 21 millions, with the annual increase rate of 53.3% and the second place in the world. The rapidly-developed Internet has penetrated into every aspect of China such as economy, politics, culture, and so on, leading to a positive and profound social reform. However, with the constantly high development of Chinese Internet, there are relevant problems involved in. The invisibility of network environment brought many problems such as Internet fraud, junk mail, and mal-intended software. In the trade of Internet, economic activities are in the multiple forms of uncertainty-such as the quality of information, the trade partner, the means of trade, the commercial credit and so on, leaving more crimes and fraud in the Internet trade. In a word, the usually-existing trust loss and the promotion of Internet trade trust in Internet environment, especially the Internet trade environment, are the urgent problems.The influential factors in the Internet trade trust loss are from different aspects, including the network itself and the external environment of Internet operation and existence-which are divided into three levels, morality, legal system and information. This dissertation is mainly based on the level of information, the viewpoint of initiatively solving information asymmetry, the research accomplishments of existing Internet trade trust and game theory. It establishes the signal transfer model of Internet trade, KMRW reputation model, incomplete information static game theory model and trust-agent model, makes several valuable conclusions, and proposed many policies and suggestions such as decreasing the information asymmetry in Internet environment, decreasing the risk and increasing Internet trust.The researches are divided into eight chapters, among which the parts between the second chapter and the eighth chapter are the main body.The first chapter is the introduction, mainly discussing the research background of the dissertation, defining the research boundaries, pointing out the purposes and significances of the research.The second chapter is about trust reference summery, separately stating the traditional trust theory and Internet trade trust theory, mainly introducing the influential factors of Internet trust-Internet main body, the relative party and the environment-and the research models of Internet trust-theoretical model, entity model and normative model.The third chapter analyzes the adverse selection problem in network environment based on game theory, points out that under the condition of information asymmetries no matter how high the acquaintance between the two parts of the trade, there is still the adverse selection in the two parts of one certain trade.The forth chapter discusses the trade warrant relevant issues in Internet trade by establishing Internet trade incomplete information static game theory model, makes the conclusion that when Internet trade requires more sellers participate the bid and the Internet trade efficiency can be increased and the Internet trust can be strengthened by seller decreasing the products' fixed cost, operation cost and accumulated credit cost and buyer trying to group trade.The fifth chapter: KMRW model applied with Internet trade states that under certain circumstances, the two parties of the trade game will give up on optimizing short-term interest in order to optimize the long-term interest and will stick to the cooperation strategy; for maintaining the long-term cooperation, the seller tries the best to keep the reasonable profit other than the extreme high profit and in the condition of one party is honest and the other is cheating, the more the loss is, the more both parties are tending to cooperate for a long time. At last, accordingly it points out that maintaining the Internet brand has a great significance on keeping the Internet seller's reputation and promoting Internet trust.The sixth chapter analyzes the condition and the equilibrium result of information signaling with the application of information signaling model, points out that decreasing the cost of good quality seller promoting credit level and increasing the cost of poor quality seller promoting credit level makes the credit level in Internet take the role of transferring product's information, decreasing the information asymmetry and adverse selection in Internet trade; under these circumstances, the seller and the buyer have two departed equilibriums, and the payment function ( the revenue) are separately: ( P_H - C_G - C_GT, V_G - P_H ),(P_L-C_B-C_BT, V_B-P_L) ( among which P_H and P_L are the price offers on different qualities of products, P_H> P_L, C_G and C_B are the costs of products with different qualities, C_G > C_B , C_GT and C_BT are the accumulated credit costs of different Internet sellers, C_GT < C_BT , V_G and V_B are the effects on sellers posed by products with different qualities, V_G>V_B) ; it's good to Internet trust by minishing cost gaps of Internet goods. At last, accordingly it proposes several policies and advises. The seventh chapter analyzes the relevant issues on bringing the third party in the Internet trade by establishing Internet trade trust-agent model, points out that in the condition of information asymmetry, the maximal effort level of the agent is less than the effort level of that under information symmetry, and the expected revenue of the seller is less than that under information symmetry; and the more the agent avoids the risk, the more the negative effect of the effort, the stronger the uncertainty of the output, the smaller the marginal revenue of agent working hard; the marginal cost of agent working hard only has the link with output sharing coefficientsβandχ, and is the increasing function of output sharing coefficient; through putting the measurable exogenous variable z in the contract, on the one hand, the leftover share of the agent can be increased, leaving increased motivation strength in contract and neglecting the influence outside, on the other hand, the risk taken by the agent can be decreased. At last, according the difference between the influential factors of the third party's endeavor level and the risk preference, it proposes some relevant policies and suggestions.The eighth chapter is the summery and the research prospect, mainly summarizing the theoretical innovation and practical significance and pointing out the shortcomings of the research and the research direction in future.