| The theory of optimal compensation contract is an effective tool to solve the agency problem between the owner and the operator of an enterprise.Its purpose is to attract and retain the executives with outstanding talents and wisdom,to stimulate their innovative consciousness and willingness,making decisions to maximize the interests of shareholders,and creating more profits to enterprises.Based on the data of Chinese A-share companies of manufacturing listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange during the period from 2010 to 2017,the paper theoretically analyzes and empirically tests the impact of executive compensation to the enterprise innovation from aspects of monetary compensation,equity compensation and pay gap.The results show:(1)monetary compensation has promotion effect on enterprise innovation;(2)equity compensation has promotion effect on enterprise innovation;(3)there is a nonlinear and inverted U-shape relationship between pay gap and enterprise innovation.Pay gap has promotion effect on enterprise innovation within the reasonable range,otherwise it will inhibit enterprise innovation.From the perspective of monetary compensation,equity compensation and pay gap,this paper has great theoretical significance in broadening and deepening executive compensation and enterprise innovation and other related studies.In addition to theoretical reference value,the conclusion of this paper also has vital practical significance.First,for enterprise regulatory authorities,it is helpful to improve the supervision system and establish an effective incentive mechanism for enterprise innovation.Second,for listed companies,it is helpful for shareholders to deeply understand the important role of incentive mechanism to talents and enterprise innovation,and rationally formulate and adjust compensation incentive schemes,in order to attract and retain more technical and innovative talents to improve the efficiency of enterprise innovation and contribute to the development of the enterprise. |
