Study On The Influence Of Ultimate Control Right And Board Structure On Investment Efficiency Of Family Enterprises

Investment activity is the primary force of the company to development,important foundation of enterprise cash flow to increase,and has a great influence on the enterprise.The traditional corporate governance theory focuses on the first kind of principal-agent relationship in the cases of scattered equity.However,a large number of studies have shown that,the relatively concentrated Asian enterprise equity,and the existence of ultimate controlling shareholders,led to the occurrence of the second agency relationship that large and minority shareholders have different interests.And large shareholders infringe the interests of the minority shareholders through the inefficient investment activity.Besides,in recent years,the simple scale efficiency and blind diversified investment in our country damaged the value of the enterprise seriously,and provided the ultimate controlling shareholders with conditions to grab interests of listed companies.In the process of corporate governance,investment activity is considered as the foundation of the increasing enterprise value,and the ultimate control is the main driving force of the enterprise investment decision,and closely related to investment efficiency of enterprises.Family enterprises widespread around the world,and has made a great contribution for our country’s economic development.Family business has its own characteristics in external environment and ownership structure which are different from the state-owned enterprises.Modern family business in our country began to rise after the reform and opening,and ushered in the new opportunities and challenges after many years of development.This manuscript studies the relationship between the ultimate control and investment efficiency of family enterprises,and investigates the functions of the regulating effect of the board strctures to study whether the board play a role in inhibiting the efficiency of investment,and improving the level of investment decision-making in family enterprises.This manuscript selects listed family companies from 2014 to 2016 as research samples,and analyze the influence of ultimate control and board structure of the family enterprises.The empirical results are as follows:(1)Underinvestment is widespread in the family enterprise;(2)The higher proportion ultimate control of the family enterprise,the lower corporate investment efficiency is;(3)The scale of the board of directors has significantly inhibites the efficiency of investment;(4)The proportion of the independent board has inhibitory effect on the investment efficiency,but the result is not significant;(5)Joining together of two position inhibits the investment efficiency of the enterprises,but the result is not significant.