| More than thirty years of reform and opening up,China’s economic development has made amazing achievements.Market economic system has been gradually improved,the industrial structure is also in constant adjustment,the emerging capital market for more companies to provide the opportunity to market.China’s family-controlled listed companies generally exist the ultimate controller,the highly concentrated ownership structure,so that they can control enterprise investment decision,in order to seek their own interests,may cause companies to non efficiency of investment behavior.On the one hand,most scholars at home and abroad in the study of the entry point,mainly concentrated in the company’s value,profitability,corporate performance and other aspects of the investment efficiency of the content of the discussion less;On the other hand,the Shanghai and Shenzhen listing Corporation as a sample analysis of more,rather than these listing Corporation to carry out a more detailed classification.First,this article consult and summarize the domestic and foreign related companies investment behavior,equity structure,investment efficiency,and other existing literature through the network,books,periodicals and other channels;Secondly,the paper defines the basic concepts involved in the article,by means of theoretical research,based on the principal-agent theory,incomplete contract theory and control theory,combs the rule of the controlling mode of family listing Corporation and the current situation of equity structure;Then take "the second agency problem" as the starting point,in the perspective of the ultimate controller of controlling shareholders to grab control effect of private benefit motive,opportunity and in family listed corporate investment behavior analysis;Finally,select the Shanghai and Shenzhen two non-financial family-controlled listing Corporation as the research object,Through the establishment of measurement model of investment efficiency,evaluation of family listed company now has the efficiency of the investment,the establishment of ownership structure and investment efficiency of regression model,respectively on the investment excessive group and insufficient investment group regression,we found the correlation between ownership structure and investment efficiency.In this paper,the following conclusions are drawn through the combination of qualitative research and quantitative research: Ultimate controller through the construction of complex ownership structure,to achieve the listing Corporation’s super control,so that its control and cash flow right deviation.In order to maximize the interests of the family,access to control for personal gain,the ultimate control of the behavior of the strip has a stronger power.Empirical studies have found that most of the investment efficiency of family owned listing Corporation in China is lack of efficiency,and the number of companies with insufficient investment appears to be more than the number of companies with excessive investment.Pyramid shareholding structure and cross holding structure cause control rights and cash flow rights appearing the separation.And this separation causes the enterprise non efficiency of investment behavior deterioration.The separation of the two rights and the lack of investment has a significant positive correlation,and the relationship between investment and excessive investment is not significant.Finally in view of our country family-controlled listed companies of the actual situation,to perfect the protection of the interests of the company internal and external governance,minority shareholders,inhibition of non efficiency of investment behavior of enterprise,and puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions to raise the efficiency of capital allocation.This study provides empirical evidence on the investment efficiency of family listing Corporation,and it is helpful to evaluate the effectiveness of the investment efficiency of family listing Corporation in the future. |
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