| As a type of on-demand service platform,Didi Chuxing Platform has been widely popularized in the development of mobile Internet technology and has profoundly af-fected the daily life of consumers.We will take the Didi Chuxing Platform as an exam-ple.Consider how the managers of Didi Chuxing Platform can make the optimal dy-namic pricing strategy and wages payment strategy when consumers and express drivers are strategic,In order to maximize the benefits of the platform in equilibrium.Based on the strategic choice behavior of consumers and express drivers,this paper constructs the cost function of consumers,the income function of express drivers and the income function of the platform,which are sequentially obtained in the three game equilibrium.This article will make a hypothesis that the waiting time of consumers is proportional to the number of waiting people and inversely proportional to the number of Didi express drivers.On the basis of this hypothesis,we have discussed the optimal decision-making of Didi’s Chuxing platform,express drivers and consumers under the two situations of consumer homogeneity and heterogeneity.In addition,based on the M/M/n queuing model,this paper will derive the expected waiting time of the consumer waiting for the express driver,and substitute the expected waiting time formula into the basic model.Based on this,the pricing strategy response function of the Didi Chuxing Platform is obtained.The main conclusions of this paper are:(ⅰ)the probability of consumers choosing Didi Chuxing Platform increases with the number of express drivers,and decreases with the number of taxi drivers.(ⅱ)At the peak of the demand for taxis,the Didi Chuxing Plat-form should increase the wages payment rate to attract more service providers.(ⅲ)When the express drivers are heterogeneous,the Didi Chuxing Platform will develop a dy-namic wage payout ratio. |
