The Influence Of Managerial Power On Audit Quality Of Listed Companies In China

Audit quality is used to measure whether audit work is real and effective.Modern joint-stock companies usually have the characteristics of separation of ownership and management rights.There is a principal-agent and internal and external information asymmetry in the governance mechanism of listed companies.Under the condition of imperfect supervision mechanism,the management layer monitors the operation process of the company,and holds the generation and disclosure of the information of the company’s accounts.The management layer is available.It can make use of its own power to whitewash and adjust financial reports,resulting in a decline in the quality of financial reporting and the audit quality of the company.Therefore,the excessive concentration of management power may lead to the high control of the executive,the effectiveness of the corporate governance mechanism,the decline of the authenticity of the quality of accounting information and the audit quality of the company.It is a matter of thinking and urgency that how to restrain,manage the management to use its power rationally,improve the audit efficiency,guarantee the quality of audit,and make the investors get high quality and credible financial accounting information.This article first defines the concept of the listed company’s management power and audit quality and carefully finds its measurement methods,sorts out related theories of principal-agent theory and information asymmetry theory,and analyzes the power of the management of listed companies on this basis.The impact of audit quality.The sample of 1273 listed A-share companies listed in the Taian’an database from 2007 to 2016 was selected as an example to empirically study the impact of management power on the quality of audits and the degree of impact differences under different property rights.The research results show that the greater the power of the management of the listed company,the lower the audit quality,that is,the power of the management will have a negative effect on the quality of the audit;compared with non-state-owned enterprises,the state-owned enterprises will weaken the negative impact of management power on audit quality.effect.The above results verify the hypothesis of this paper.Based on the above results,this article proposes specific recommendations to help the company improve the quality of its audits,and then deepen the reform of the state-owned system and improve relevant policies and regulations.