Will Chairman Of The State-owned Enterprise With Frequent Assignment Be More Short-sighted?

The executive management system is an important part of the reform of state-owned enterprises,and a good system is related to the long-term value of state-owned enterprises.However,due to the dual nature of politics and commerce,state-owned enterprises have become the"businessmen"of the state-owned enterprises,and they are the "quasi-official officials" who shoulder political responsibilities.They are in the government’s internal labor market and face frequent positions under administrative orders.Studies have shown that frequent changes in officials will have an impact on local economic development.Therefore,this paper studies whether the frequent transfer of the chairman of state-owned enterprises will also have an impact on the behavioral decisions of corporate governance.Therefore,this paper selects the background characteristics of the frequent transfer experience of the chairman of the state-owned enterprise to study the relationship between the executive management system and the corporate governance of state-owned enterprises.Based on the above analysis,this paper takes the A-share listed state-owned enterprises in 2008-2014 as the research sample,and uses R&D investment as the research perspective to analyze and verify the influence of the frequent transfer experience of the chairman of state-owned enterprises on the R&D investment of enterprises,and its transmission mechanism and influence,factor.The study found that:(1)The chairman of the state-owned enterprise with frequent transfer experience is more short-sighted and will hold less cash reserves,thereby limiting R&D investment.(2)The reason is that the company’s internal and external expansion is carried out in pursuit of short-term performance,and the R&D investment is squeezed out.In addition,in order to study the management management system in more depth,this paper also explores the impact of executive performance evaluation and senior management term.It is found that:(1)When the senior management faces the pressure of small performance appraisal,the short-sight effect caused by frequent transfer will be significant.When the performance appraisal pressure is large,it is not significant.(2)When the senior management expects a shorter term,the relative short-sightedness caused by frequent transfer will be significant.It is expected that the term of office will not be significant for a long time.This paper takes the lead in the study of executive transfer related to the management system of state-owned enterprises as a research object,and expands the perspective of studying the reform of state-owned enterprises from the senior management system.This paper uses the transfer experience indicators to describe the professional experience of executives,enriches the dimension of executive trait interpretation,and manually combs and processes a large number of data in the professional background of the board of directors of A-share listed state-owned enterprises during the research period.Finally,this paper also attempts to explore the incentives of the performance appraisal system to the psychological motivation of the state-owned enterprise chairman,and further enrich the discussion on the state-owned enterprise executive management system.