The Conflict Of Corporate Social Responsibility

Corporate social responsibility(CSR)has been greatly valued by both theory and practice.In reality,however,some companies which perform very well in some fields of CSR,cause big trouble to society in some others.The agency problem may be one important cause that leads to this dua l behavior form of CSR.On the one hand,during undertaking social responsibility,the management will face problems such as heavy tasks or ineffective incentive mechanism,which makes it difficult for them to respond to CSR positively.On the other hand,the necessity and importance of CSR requires management to take action,and they may obtain private benefits through the process,so management may show a positive attitude towards some specific forms.Considering the convenience and safety of charitable donation,this paper takes donation as a specific form and compares it with the overall level of CSR.This paper selects a total of 3,253 observation samples from listed companies in 2009-2015.The empirncal tests show that the two forms have significant differences,where the more serious the agency problem,the lower the level of overall CSR,but the higher the level of charitable donation.Further analysis show that when the level of social responsibility is relatively low,its potential risks will alleviate this differential performance caused by agency conflicts.Besides,the improvement of regional marketization and trust can strengthen the effect of formal or informal institutions,thereby reducing the interference of agency conflicts on CSR.This paper is aimed at calling on companies to strengthen the supervision of the management’s fulfillment of CSR.Although the responsibilities which are easier to take,just like donation,can also do good to social welfare,if the management overly practices this form and ignores the others,it will damage the relationship with some essential stakeholders,which will finally make great trouble to the company.