Empirical Research On The Relationship Between Executive Equity Incentive And R&D Efficiency Under Financing Constraints

With the accelerating pace of economic globalization,the links between countries have become closer and the market competition has become more intense,and technological innovation has gradually become an endogenous driving force for enterprise development.Different from the general manufacturing enterprises,high-tech enterprises are more important in the market economy of China because they pay more attention to the ability of technological innovation and actively carry out R&D activities.For a long time,high-tech enterprises are facing capital constraints and inefficiencies in R&D activities.In the case of limited resources,how to ensure high-quality R&D efficiency is of great significance to enhance the core competitiveness of enterprises and realize value-added.The thesis sorts out the existing domestic and foreign related literatures,with information asymmetry theory,principal-agent theory,technological innovation theory and financing constraint theory as the theoretical basis,from the internal factors of enterprises and external environmental factors,to the financing constraints,executives the relationship between equity incentives and R&D efficiency is analyzed.The thesis selects the A-share high-tech enterprises of the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges in 2015-2017,and excludes the sample of enterprises that have not disclosed R&D personnel input and R&D expenditure input data.The enterprise R&D efficiency is measured by using data envelopment analysis(DEA)and the financing constraint index is constructed by using binary logistic regression model.Firstly,a detailed descriptive statistical analysis of R&D efficiency,executive equity incentives,financing constraints and various control variables is carried out,and correlation analysis is used to test the rationality of variable selection.Secondly,multiple hypothesis analysis is used to verify the proposed hypothesis and to be robust.After the test,the conclusion is drawn: there is a significant inverted U-type relationship between executive equity incentives and R&D efficiency.That is,with the increase in the shareholding ratio of executives,the R&D efficiency of enterprises has increased first and then decreased.At the same time,financing constraints promote the relationship between executive equity incentives and corporate R&D efficiency.The higher the degree of financing constraints faced by enterprises,the more significant the inverted U-type relationship between executive equityincentives and R&D efficiency.The thesis reveals the impact mechanism of financing constraints,executive equity incentives and R&D efficiency,thus providing enterprises with an effective way to improve R&D efficiency.