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Executives Incentive Contract Combinations,Financial Constraints And Innovation Efficiency

Posted on:2019-08-15Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:H ChenFull Text:PDF
GTID:2429330545484791Subject:Accounting
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The report of the 19 th National Congress of the Communist Party of China proposed accelerating the building of an innovative country,striving to bring about disruptive technological innovations and advocating a culture of innovation.Innovation ability is the key for enterprises to maintain their market competitiveness and improve business performance,it is also an important factor that determines whether a company can grow steadily and sustainably.Enterprises as the main body of innovation,the limited resources of its innovation determines that enterprises must improve the efficiency of innovation as the most important issue for enterprises to maintain innovation,and executives as corporate innovation strategy makers and implementers,will inevitably affect the enterprise innovation resources Configuration and utilization efficiency.GEM as a representative of innovative SME,collecting of a group in the production,service,material technology innovation needs of high-tech enterprises.Therefore,this article chooses the GEM companies with more concentrated innovation as the research object,chooses the 2012-2016 five-year data as the research sample,and from the perspective of the executive incentive contract,examines the difference between the executive incentive contract and the enterprise innovation efficiency,On this basis,it analyzes how to guide senior management to maximize the innovation efficiency of enterprises through effective incentive contract.At the same time,considering that enterprises are generally faced with financing constraints in actual innovation activities,this paper further includes financing constraints into the research framework,and analyzes the impact of financing constraints on the relationship between executive incentives and enterprise innovation efficiency.On the basis of summarizing and reviewing the existing literature,this paper attempts to make innovations in the following two aspects:(1)Most of the researches on the influencing factors of innovation efficiency are from a macroscopic level.Based on principal-agent theory,Contract theory and management rights theory,trying to study the impact on the efficiency of enterprise innovation from the micro-level factors of executive incentive contract;(2)The existing research on executive incentive contract is mostly limited to dominant incentive contract Salary incentive and equity incentive).Based on this,this article combines the inherent characteristics of implicit incentives,examines the impact of implicit incentive contracts and incentive contracts on the efficiency of enterprise innovation,and deepens the existing research.The main conclusions of this paper are as follows:(1)Monetary compensation incentives of executives are positively correlated with the efficiency of corporate innovation.There is a significant inverted U-shaped relationship between executive incentive and control incentives and corporate innovation efficiency,showing the incentive of equity and control Double effect;executive promotion incentives have a certain negative impact on the efficiency of business innovation,the behavior theory of the performance of the GEM companies more obvious.(2)Through the analysis and research of portfolio incentive contract,we find that there exists a complementary effect between executive compensation and equity incentive,while the increase of equity incentive compensation proportion is conducive to the improvement of enterprise's innovation efficiency.And equity incentive and control There is a substitution effect between incentives,showing similarities in incentive effects.(3)Considering the financing constraints,we find that the financing constraints affect the relationship between executive incentive contract and firm innovation efficiency.Specifically,the financing constraints will inhibit the positive relationship between the monetary compensation incentive and the innovation efficiency of enterprises,as well as the double effect of restraining the incentive of controlling rights.However,the existence of financing constraints has a positive impact on the dual effects of equity incentive,and the financing constraints will also restrain The Negative Effects of Promotion Incentives on the Efficiency of Enterprise Innovation.The conclusion of this paper shows that the shareholders of GEM should be aware of the existence of implicit incentives,pay attention to the combination effect of the monetary compensation incentive and equity incentive in the design of executive incentive contract,and raise the proportion of remuneration of equity incentive within a reasonable range,At the same time,some weakening of control incentives(on-the-job consumption)and promotion incentives(salary gap)are provided,which provide empirical evidence for optimizing executive incentivecontract mechanism and enhancing enterprise innovation efficiency.
Keywords/Search Tags:executive incentive, innovation efficiency, financing constraints, incentive contract combinations
PDF Full Text Request
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