| Most scholars considered how to solve the problem of R&D investment from the perspective of enterprise management and corporate governance,such as increasing government subsidies to reduce the financing constraints of enterprises,selecting managers with certain personal characteristics to be responsible for the operation of enterprises or carrying out equity incentives to reduce the agency costs of enterprise operation to promote R&D investment of enterprises.Most scholars often start from the enterprise itself and regard the enterprise as an individual in the market to study the problem of low R&D investment,ignoring the impact of management group on individual enterprises.In recent years,a large number of domestic and foreign related literature shows that the pyramid structure exists widely in enterprise from various countries.As a common form of modern enterprise group management,pyramid structure has attracted the attention of Chinese and foreign scholars.Some literatures have proved that some characteristics of pyramid structure have a significant impact on R&D investment of listed companies.However,these literatures mainly investigate the scale effect and tunnel effect brought by pyramid structure,ignoring the first kind of agency cost that may be caused by pyramid structure.Management is responsible for the daily operation of listed companies,grasping the R&D investment of enterprises,so it is very important to consider the impact of different characteristics of the pyramid structure on the R&D investment of listed companies.In the empirical part,this paper takes all listed companies in China from 2010 to 2014 as the research object,using the theory of principal-agent,the separation of powers and the optimal contract and other related theories,discussing the impact of the different control chain length of listed companies in the pyramid structure on the prospect of R&D investment.At the same time this paper discusses the impact of the different control chain length of listed companies in the pyramid structure.It further examines whether the nature of property rights and equity incentives can adjust the relationship of the control chain length and R&D investment.The results show that:(1)the length of control chain is negatively related to R&D investment,that is,the longer the length of control chain,the less R&D investment the listed companies have;(2)there is no evidence shows that property rights can adjust the relationship between the length of control chain and R&D investment;(3)equity incentives can restrain the length of control chain and R&D investment.With the existing of equity incentives,it can alleviate the lack of supervision caused by the control chain,reduce the first kind of agency costs and increase the R&D investment of listed companies.Combined with the empirical analysis and results,this paper puts forward the following suggestions:(1)Strengthening the internal control of the company,improve the performance appraisal system and strengthen the ultimate controller's supervision of the daily operation of listed companies.(2)Constantly improve the compensation contract of the management of listed companies,when the contract is imperfect,the lack of compensation contract can be compensated by equity incentive.(3)In the state-owned pyramid structure,besides the above two suggestions,we should also pay attention to the ethical level of candidates in the selection process of management,relying on the management's own ethical level to achieve self-restraint in the latter stage and consider incentives for political promotion in addition to compensation equity incentives. |
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