Research On The Implementation Effect Of Delisting System Of China's Listed Companies

Since its establishment,China's securities market has experienced more than 20 years of rapid development and achieved remarkable results.Both system construction,market subject development and financial infrastructure construction have made remarkable achievements.The securities market plays an active role in optimizing the allocation of resources,reducing the financing cost of enterprises and encouraging enterprises to improve the operating efficiency.A reasonable and efficient securities market must have the ability to spit out the old and absorb the new.The efficient operation of securities market needs a reasonable delisting system as the cornerstone.A sound delisting system is conducive to optimizing the allocation of resources,improving enterprises' enthusiasm for profit and protecting investors.2015 through registration system reform of the National People's Congress authorization decisions,but because at present in the multi-level market system construction,traders,maturity of the securities market pricing power,as well as the market valuation,etc,there are many problems completely and registration system reform,on February 23,2018 the standing committee of the National People's Congress would authorize decided to implement the extended until February 29,2020.Registration system reform is imperative,in the foreseeable future,the number of listed companies in China will enter a blowout period.In the new period,the perfection and development of delisting system also need to be put on the agenda.China's delisting system has such drawbacks as unclear delisting standards,lengthy delisting procedures,inadequate implementation of delisting policies,and listed companies' use of rule loopholes to avoid delisting.For a long time,China's securities market delisting rate has been extremely low.The imperfect rules and the bad tendency of listed companies to love the value of shell resources lead to the existence of rent-seeking space.All listed companies conduct profit tendering and asset restructuring through fraudulent issuance,illegal letter covering,and ulterior accounting treatment of the company.The shell protection movement of a-share market is staged vigorously every year.These low-value listed companies occupy precious market resources in the market,while some real high-quality companies cannot enter the market as soon as possible to obtain the resources needed for the company's development because of the stock issuing system.The investment function and rational resource allocation function of the securities market have been damaged.This paper intends to analyze and study the implementation effect of delisting system of listed companies in China under the background of registration system reform.This paper makes a comparative analysis of the delisting systems of Shanghai and shenzhen stock exchanges in China,New York stock exchange and Hong Kong stock exchange in the United States.This paper studies the implementation effect of delisting system from the perspective of*ST listed companies to study whether China's delisting system has played its due role in the survival of the fittest,that is,whether the delisting system can effectively eliminate bad listed companies.In this paper,the implement of calendar year*ST shares,cancellation*ST shares and delisted stocks were statistically analyzed,found in most of the implementation of the delisting risk warning of listed companies can be achieved by a profit cap,annual retreat city rate is only 0.3%,far lower than the mature securities market delisted rate 8%to 15%a year,the delisting system implementation effect is poor.Through the statistical analysis of ROA before and after hat removal of*ST listed companies,this paper found that the performance of*ST listed companies in key years of turn round would be significantly improved,but this performance improvement was not sustainable.Earnings management to avoid suspension or delisting is common in*ST listed companies.This paper analyzes and demonstrates earnings management of*ST listed companies from two aspects:empirical analysis and classical case analysis.Earnings management can be divided into accrual earnings management and real earnings management.Accrued surplus management,this article selects 2017 removable cap listed companies as samples and set up the control group,by extending the Jones model to simulate the turn round in those days surplus management analysis,found that pick cap*ST listed company turnaround was a significant rise in profit behavior,and the control group,there is no significant profit regulate behavior in the same year,pick a hat is not a real improve performance of listed companies,but by adjusting the distribution of profits in different years evade delisted.Real earnings management,based on the classic case chang Jiu three times*ST and*ST three times to cancel*ST,for example,suggests that China's performance was on the verge of delisting*ST companies how to through the government subsidies,a variety of means such as asset restructuring under the condition of the company's performance is not simply to improve implementation to pick a hat to protect shell,illustrate the delisting system in China does not play a role of evolution.Finally,based on the existing problems of the delisting system in China,this paper provides Suggestions for improvement of the delisting standards,the subject of delisting implementation and the construction of China's securities and financial market.