Internal Control, The Nature Of Property Rights, And The Lack Of Corporate Investment

Investment is an important economic activity of an enterprise.Investment efficiency relates to the sustainable development and value of the company.The level of investment efficiency is related to the long-term development and overall value of the company.In modern enterprise systems,internal control systems and property rights systems are important systems that affect the development of enterprises.A sound internal control system and a sound property rights system are conducive to improving operational efficiency and increasing corporate value.According to the study,principal-agent conflicts and information asymmetry are the main reasons leading to inefficient investment.The internal control has the function of making up for the incompleteness of the corporate contract and improving the asymmetric information between the company and the external parties.Therefore,it is related to the management of non-efficiency investment of the enterprises.At the same time,the investment behavior of a company will be affected by the arrangement of the enterprise's property rights system.Different property rights determines the corporate governance structure,which leads to significant differences in agency costs and agency efficiency.Research shows that there are phenomena of non-efficient investment in Chinese enterprises(ie overinvestment or underinvestment),and the problem of underinvestment is more common.This article starts with the problem of improving the underinvestment of enterprises and adopts a combination of normative analysis and empirical analysis to study the impact of internal controls on underinvestment and the impact of internal controls on the underinvestment of companies with different property rights.This paper expounds that internal control has a deterrent effect on underinvestment of companies.It also analyzes the differences between state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises from the aspects of financing environment,agency costs,and government intervention,which affect the suppression of internal control on underinvestment of companies.This paper uses the 5462 data of A-share non-financial listed companies from 2014 to 2016 as a sample,uses the Richardson model to measure the degree of underinvestment in the company,and uses the DIB internal control index to measure the quality of internal control.By setting up a fixed-time effect model and two-way fixed-effects model,it is verified that internal control can effectively inhibit the investment of the enterprises;compared with state-owned enterprises,internal control has a stronger inhibitory effect on the underinvestment of non-state-owned enterprises.This article has clarified the relationship between internal control,property rights and investment efficiency,which will help companies enhance their awareness of building internal control,improve the internal control system of enterprises,promote the management level and economic efficiency of enterprises,and help deepen the reform of state-owned enterprises and improve the operating capacity of state-owned capital..