Research About Risk Sharing And Redistribution Of The Channel Dominated By Manufacturer

With the fast development of the Internet today,the electronic commerce has an important effect on the manufacturer or middleman in the channel's behavior,so the channel conflict may have a negative impact on the whole system of marketing channels.Therefore,how to make the channel utility maximization has become the focus in the enterprise.In the marketing channels,efficient risk sharing can help the enterprise to make the correct decision,and reasonable distribution of benefits can promote the utility maximization of channel management.So both sides are important to promote the channel's efficiency.Because the manufacturer and middlemen cooperation will affected by many factors,and the environment of the market makes their cooperation among channel members more complex,so we must make it clear in risk sharing between manufacturer and middleman.When the risk more than expected,the market environment changes which cause of perception interest changes,it is necessary to analyze the channel profit.In order to prompting channel,it is necessary to change the original benefit allocation strategy through the implementation of optimal state,.The paper mainly studied channel leading by manufacturer,taking inventory cost as the main measure of risk,analyzed problem how channel members make sure risk sharing and the interests of redistribution.Using quantitative analysis The paper's purpose is to give the manufacturer leading channels of risk sharing and benefit redistribution approach.By using the establishment of the cost income model,and evolutionary game theory,through the risk reasonably effective sharing and the redistribution of interests,it's helpful to manufacturers to make decisions according to the production security coefficient and the lowest sales products to provide reference:? a = 0,the intermediate business income is negative;? = 1,manufacturers profit is negative,so neither ? = 0 nor ? = 1,the channel members cannot achieve optimal risk sharing,and then only 0<a<1 can guarantee C<W<P,which helpful to achieve the optimal target;? when the manufacturer for risk aversion preferences,according to initial cooperation risk sharing probability,through the optimal number of contract coordination of their respective {?,W} share the inventory coefficient risk,to promote the coordination and cooperation of channel members.With the change of market environment,when the risk sharing beyond members expectation,if the interest channel still maintain the original allocation unchanged may cause the channel members' dissatisfaction.through the study of evolutionary game model,it is concluded that when the manufacturer makes the largest proportion to channel,namely the middleman on channel contribution ratio is smallest,both of them should choose to change the original benefit allocation strategy.