Strengthen The Research On The Behavior Of Large Shareholders Under The Background Of Supervision

Since the share-trading reform in 2005,China's securities market has developed rapidly,and relevant laws,regulations,and regulatory systems have become increasingly sophisticated,showing a good development trend.However,there are still many new problems and challenges.The ownership structure of most enterprises in China is highly concentrated,and control is in the hands of very few shareholders.Thus,the phenomenon of "one big share" has arisen.Under this circumstance,the majority shareholder holds the majority of the company's shares and sufficient cash flow,so the major shareholder is likely to harm the interests of the minority shareholders in order to seek private profits.This has resulted in the current set of major shareholders.China's capital market is developing late,and there are big loopholes in the system constraints,which cannot effectively and efficiently restrain the major shareholders of listed companies.Therefore,under the spur of huge profits,it is not surprising that major shareholders have used the assets of listed companies for their own use through various hidden and improper ways.In recent years,the current large number of shareholders has appeared frequently,which has seriously affected the smooth operation of China's stock market,which has adversely affected the healthy development of China's capital market and the real economy.The new regulations on mergers and acquisitions revised in September 2016,“Administrative Measures for Major Assets Restructuring of Listed Companies”,and the “Provisions on the Shareholders of Listed Companies and the Regulations on the Reduction of Shares by Directors of the Board of Directors” in January 2016 and May 2017 were successively issued.Shareholders' disorderly reduction and clearance-type reductions have been restricted.However,the “set of innovations” in disguised regulation has been continuously updated,the root causes remain unresolved,and institutional issues need to be further adjusted and more substantively changed.This paper will be divided into six chapters to analyze the current set of major shareholder sets.The first chapter expounds the research background and significance,the research ideas of the whole paper,the research methods applied,the overall structural arrangement,and the innovations and shortcomings.The second chapter is at home and abroad.The literature studies the mergers and acquisitions,major shareholder reductions and equity pledges.The third chapter mainly introduces the changes in the behavior oflarge shareholders in the context of strengthening supervision and comparative analysis.The fourth chapter introduces the acquisition of Nanyang shares.The case process of Tianrongxin;the fifth chapter will analyze how to accelerate the speed of mergers and acquisitions through the class-based behavior and how to reduce the holdings of the employee stock ownership plan in this case.How do these sets of current practices evade supervision and reflect the case? The system loophole analysis;the fifth chapter summarizes and summarizes the case,and concludes that the phenomenon of large-scale cash-out of Chinese enterprises still exists under the background of continuous strengthening supervision,but the research conclusions have undergone great changes,and the existence of policies has been found through case analysis.The loopholes and the regulatory penalties are too weak.Finally,it tries to give some suggestions from the improvement of the backdoor listing certification standard,the major shareholder reduction policy and the increase of punishment.