Empirical Study On The Relativity Between Equity Incentive Of Senior Management In State-owned Companies And Firm Performance Under The Order Of Salary Restriction

Under the modern enterprise system,the owner shareholder of the enterprise has limited personal ability and does not have the ability and energy to manage the whole company.Professional managers are often selected to help the company.Because the shareholders' demands are the maximization of the value of the enterprise,the shareholders' wealth is maximized.Based on the rational broker hypothesis Professional managers are more likely to pay attention to their own interests,so there is inconsistency between the two interests,which often brings a lot of agency problems.The actual owner of the company is shareholders,while the managers are professional managers.In order to solve this problem,the theoretical and practical circles have given a model of combining supervision and incentives.In general,there are two ways to motivate professional managers,one is to give them enough monetary compensation to work hard,the other is to give them a certain stock option so that they can give their shares after fulfilling the objectives set by the owners of the company,under which the professional managers and the company shares But in the actual capital market practice,too much monetary compensation for professional managers will bring huge costs,which are often unwilling for shareholders,and equity incentives are subject to regulatory constraints and the owner's grasp of control rights,so how to choose supervision and control The way to encourage and develop effective contract constraints is a topic worthy of attention.This paper takes the issue of the Central Enterprise Limit Order in 2015 as the time node to study the impact of monetary compensation and equity incentives on corporate performance of Listed Companies in China before and after the Limit Order.With this as the point of view,it is expected to explore the reasonable arrangement of executive compensation in China,and to manage the executive compensation of listed companies,especially state-owned enterprises.We should provide some suggestions and Countermeasures to help implement the policy and redistribute the social and economic resources fairly,so as to contribute to the great goal of building a well-off society in an all-round way.The chapters of this article are arranged as follows:The first chapter is introduction.This paper introduces the background of the topic of executive compensation and corporate performance,the research ideas and some basic methods and the possible contributions of this paper.The second chapter is literature review.This chapter first defines the related concepts of corporate executives,equity incentives,and then summarizes the principal-agent theory,incentive theory and political cost hypothesis and other related theoretical basis,summarizes the domestic and foreign equity incentives and corporate performance related research status.We should increase our understanding of the current stage of research in the academic field,so as to provide some help for the follow-up research.The third chapter is research design.On the basis of theoretical analysis,this paper puts forward a hypothesis on the relationship between equity incentive and firm performance of state-owned enterprise executives in the context of "pay limit order".Firstly,the hypothesis of this paper is that under the background of "pay limit order",executives reduce cash compensation to equity incentives after the implementation of the plan.Suppose two is the correlation between executive equity ratio and corporate performance in China's listed companies.Further study the relationship between equity incentive and enterprise performance.The hypothesis of this paper is that the three state-owned enterprises have weaker impact on corporate performance than private equity executives' equity incentives.According to the hypothesis mentioned in this paper,the sample selection and data sources are explained.Thirdly,the explanatory variables,explanatory variables and control variables are selected.Finally,the research model is designed.The fourth chapter is empirical test and analysis.According to the research hypothesis,this paper carries on the related empirical test.The expected result is that the state-owned enterprises are willing to reduce the monetary salary and turn to equity incentive under the "salary limit order".There is a correlation between equity incentive and enterprise performance.The influence of equity incentive is weaker in the state-owned enterprises than in the private enterprises.The fifth chapter,research inspiration and prospect.This paper reviews the full text,and puts forward research conclusions and suggestions based on this study,and discusses the inadequacies of this study and possible future research directions.Taking all state-owned listed companies trading in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2012 to 2017 as the primary sample,this paper explores the impact of the change of executive cash compensation to equity incentives on corporate performance after the order of pay limitation as the demarcation point.