An Empirical Study On M&A Performance,Earnings Management And Executive Compensation

In recent years,with the release of a series of national merger and reorganization policy,a wave of merger and acquisition has been set off in China.As the most important means of the company's resource integration,the success of M & A will have a significant and far-reaching impact on the company.As executives and participants of M & A,executives' motivation will have a significant impact on the operation and financial status of companies after mergers and acquisitions.Therefore,this paper studies the relationship between M & A performance,earnings management and executive compensation from the motivation of executives' Mergers and acquisitions.It is hoped that it will help to improve the executive compensation contract and standardize the merger and acquisition behavior of the company.According to the agency theory and arrogance theory of mergers and acquisitions,the separation of company ownership and management right and information asymmetry may lead to irrational acquisitions by executives who are self-interested or overconfident.However,the proceeds of such M & A projects are bound to be poor.Will executives then make earnings management if they pursue high pay growth or avoid conflicts with shareholders? Based on the above problems as the main idea,with the agent theory,hubris theory in merger and reorganization as the foundation,taking the major M & A events occurred in 2009 to 2014 listed companies as samples,this paper uses the method of combination of theoretical analysis and empirical research,studing whether the earnings of M & A will affect earnings management and executive compensation after M & A.The article is divided into three parts,including six chapters.The first part includes the introduction,theory and literature review,theoretical analysis and research hypothesis.It mainly expounds the research background and significance,theoretical basis;collates the related documents of M & A performance,earnings management and executive compensation,and then puts forward the two hypotheses.The second part is an empirical study,which mainly includes the definition of variables,the design of regression models,the processing of data,and the interpretation of the results of regression.The third part is the research conclusions and suggestions,mainly expounds the results of the article,and puts forward the countermeasures and suggestions,and finally points out the shortcomings of the article.The results show that:(1)the earnings management after M & A is negatively related to the earnings of M & A,the lower the earnings of M & A,the greater the degree of earnings management after M & A.(2)earnings management and M & A gains have an alternative effect on executive compensation change after M & A,that is,earnings management can weaken the impact of M & A earnings on executive compensation,and the lower the M & A returns,the more executives' earnings management can increase executive compensation.In the previous study of M & A performance,earnings management and executive compensation,this paper combines the three to study.From the manager's behavior motivation,we put the study of earnings management and executive compensation in the framework of mergers and acquisitions,widening the research perspective and enriching previous studies,hoping to provide some reference for improving the design and making of the executive compensation contract,perfecting the company system environment and standardizing the merger and acquisition behavior of the company.