Evolutionary Game Analysis And Policy Suggestions On Public Participation In Food Safety Regulation

In recent years,with the development of China's economy,the types of food have become more and more colorful.However,along with the development of the food industry,food safety problems also arise.The frequent occurrence of food safety incidents reveals that there are serious defects in China's food safety supervision system.After each food safety incident was exposed by the media,the government supervision department began to deal with it in a hurry,and the food safety supervision department also encountered many problems such as delayed response and unclear rights and responsibilities.Some scholars pointed out that public participation in food safety supervision is an effective means to solve food safety problems,which can make up for the deficiency of relying solely on government supervision mode.But how should the government cooperate and guide the public to participate in food safety regulation? Domestic scholars have not solved this problem well.At first,this paper discusses the effectiveness of public participation in food safety supervision and the necessity to compare the system elaboration and explanation,and then based on the analysis between the public and the market main body of the evolutionary game analysis on how the government should cooperate with the public and guide the public participation in food safety supervision has made a detailed theoretical analysis,and then based on the public participation in the United States,Japan's food safety regulatory experience introduction,guide our government how to supervise and leader the public participation in food safety supervision of the specific policy implications,Finally,this paper Suggestions on improving public participation in food safety supervision in China based on the theoretical policy direction derived from the evolutionary game and the specific policy experience of foreign countries.First of all,this paper believes that before analyzing how the public should participate in food safety supervision,it is necessary to make a more systematic exposition of the need for public participation in food safety supervision.This paper first expounds the basis of public participation from the three aspects of multi-center governance theory,participatory democracy theory and ladder theory of public participation,which reflects that public participation is an effective governance means to solve public affairs and the insufficient degree of public participation in China.At the same time,public participation can also play a good role in promoting social democracy,fairness and free development of society.Then,from the three aspects of market failure,government supervision failure and complexity of food market,this paper expounds the practical basis for public participation in food supervision,which reflects the urgent demand for public participation in food safety supervision for practical constraints such as information asymmetry,low efficiency of government supervision and wide spatial distribution of food market.Secondly,as for how the public should participate in food safety supervision,this paper believes that two aspects should be considered: one is how the government should cooperate with the public to manage food safety problems;Second,how should the government guide the public to actively participate in the supervision of food enterprises in the process of public participation in the supervision of production behaviors of enterprises? Existing literature on public participation in the supervision of food safety research in the form of a questionnaire survey on the analysis of the obstacles,lack of theoretical model analysis of correlation among various factors,in addition,the existing literature is based on the perspective of the static analysis,it is difficult to simulate and restore public participation in food safety supervision this dynamic process,the results may not exist certain accuracy.From the perspective of evolutionary game,this paper found that whether the public can cooperate with the government to supervise food safety is related to the public's ability and participation space through the analysis of the evolutionary game model of cooperative supervision between the public and the government.When the public participation ability or when there is insufficient space on the regulation,the public are reluctant to participate in food safety regulatory cooperation,only when the public participation in the capacity,and the government to give the public enough to participate in space,the public and the government is,the more likely it tends to cooperation problem,the supervision of food safety,in which the government can improve the ability of public participation and participate in space to cooperate with the public to participate in the food safety work.In addition,this paper analyzes how the government should guide the public to participate in the supervision by building the evolutionary game model of public supervision and production of food enterprises and finds that whether the public supervises the production behavior of food enterprises is related not only to the government's reward but also to the public's own psychological expectation.Government incentives play a guiding role in public participation in food safety supervision,but high government incentives will lead to a periodic oscillation.Only when the expected benefits of the public are higher than the expected costs,and the government gives appropriate incentives,will the public participate in the supervision of the production behavior of enterprises.Thirdly,combining with the theoretical direction of how the government should cooperate and guide the public to participate in food safety supervision and the specific policy experience of foreign public participation in food safety supervision,this paper puts forward some Suggestions on how to improve the public participation in food safety supervision in China.This paper is divided into the following Suggestions: first,detailed food safety legislation.Compared with developed countries,the research on food safety supervision in China is relatively late,and relevant laws and regulations on food safety are not perfect.In some provisions of food safety laws and regulations in China,the positioning is vague,the practical operation is not strong,and the binding force is weak.Our country can learn from foreign experience to improve this aspect,refine the food safety related legislation to accurately define the legal status of public participation and standardize the relevant operation process.Second,pay attention to the cultivation of public knowledge of food safety education,and improve the interest and awareness of public participation.Education is not only the foundation of people,but also the most popular way to receive and disseminate knowledge.More publicity of education can not only improve the awareness and skills of public participation,but also improve the "sensitivity" of the public to the expected benefits of participating in food safety supervision,and reduce the "aversion" of the public to the expected costs of participating in food safety supervision.Third,we should establish and maintain market order in the food industry and free up space for public participation.As for how to establish and maintain good market order,the most important approach is to establish an interactive platform for honest operation and supervision information between market entities open to the society and subject to social supervision.The "invisible hand" of the market should play the role of rational allocation of resources on the premise of maintaining a fair and just market order,with a unified,open and orderly modern market competition system,only in this way can consumers effectively enter food safety supervision,using the market mechanism to obtain legitimate rights and interests;Fourth,strengthen team building and improve the incentive system for public participation.Good work style to the public to convey a good signal of positive motivation;In addition,a good public participation environment abroad is inseparable from its good public interest litigation system.Improving and establishing a good incentive system can not only reduce the cost of public participation in safeguarding rights,but also greatly improve the enthusiasm of public participation.Finally,the possible innovations of this paper are as follows: first,the dynamic evolution process of public participation in food safety supervision is studied by using the evolutionary game analysis method,and the common influence of multiple participation constraints on public participation in food safety supervision is revealed.Previous literature research is based on the static study is given priority to,and more is to analyze the individual factors have influence on the result of the public participation,in this paper,starting from the perspective of game theory,the evolution process of the dynamic analysis of public participation in food safety supervision and multiple participation constraint on the result of public participation,more can reflect the objective laws of public participation in food safety supervision;Secondly,the framework of prospect theory is introduced into the evolutionary game analysis between the public and enterprises,revealing the public's sensitivity to and benefits,the degree of "aversion" to participation costs and the government's incentive behavior on the supervision of public participation in the quality production behavior of food enterprises.Different from previous research literature,this paper,from the perspective of public participation psychological perception,explains the impact of public expectations and government incentives on the supervision of public participation in the production behavior of food enterprises,and lays a theoretical foundation for the proposal of policy recommendations.