The Regulation Strategy Of Food Safety Considering The Behavior Preference Of Market Players

The high rate of food safety incidence reveals the severe problem exists in our country’s food safety regulation system. For instance, the government regulation department takes action in a hurry only after the food safety issue is exposed. These issue, response lag, indefinite responsibility and so on, exist in the food safety supervision of the food safety regulation department. High cost of customer complaint depresses the customers’ activity anticipating in food safety regulation. Because of the difficulty in taking evidence and safeguard right’s high cost, when comes across food safety problem customers commonly gives up safeguard right, which indulges the illegal food firms on the contrary. Our country’s current law system’s penalty on the illegal firms is light in some extent. Firm’s low cost of breaking the law and the limit of food safety regulation resource make the illegal activity hard been found. Because benefit from the illegal activity is much bigger than the cost, food firms dare to challenge the law personally. How to find out the solution to food safety problem is still the academic and legal profession’s discussion’s hot topic.This paper comprehensively use research production in fields such as behavioral economy、evolutionary game theory、agency of agreement theory and so on. The discussion object is market players’ micro activities in food safety governance. Firstly, it introduces customers’ limited rationality’s effect on the food safety regulation measures’ effectiveness. Secondly, this paper analyses the quality safety level in food market under the interactive influence of the firm production activity and the official supervision behavior. Then it analyses government enterprise conspiracy mechanism in food safety governance. In the last, it supposes food safety’s “society multi-governance”.This paper’s main conclusions includes:(1) Currently customers’ rationality level is a little low and the food safety certification system is imperfect. It is very vital to set the minimum quality standard. An unusual low domain cannot guard customers, while unreasonable high domain make partly customers utilities loss. The appropriate domain get the largest success possibility of making customers’ loss zero. Moreover, considering China’s current food safety condition, it is necessary to combine kinds of food safety regulation measures and make them complement each theirs. Then it structures perfect food safety regulation scheme.(2) When the official’s motivation to try hard to supervise is not enough, meanwhile the illegal enterprise’s penalty after the media’s exposure is light, the official supervisory negligence is common phenomenon and the market is full of fake and inferior food. When the official’s incentive from doing best to supervise does not cover the supervisory cost, meanwhile the illegal enterprise’s penalty after the media’s exposure is light, the official will take campaign-style governance mode and the whole market’s food quality safety level will be in a cyclical swing condition. It could be found that the single-center governance mode which makes the official as the single governance party cannot breakthrough the “hardly govern and hardly prevent” dilemma.(3)Even if the effectiveness of customers’ complaint is not significant, the complaint threatens the government-enterprise conspiracy. However, customers’ high complaint cost makes the higher supervisory be government-enterprise conspiracy’s only constraint. The possibility of government-enterprise conspiracy will be much larger when the possibility higher supervisory exists is smaller. The extreme condition is that when customers’ complaint cost is very high and the possibility higher supervisory exists is zero, the penalty to the official and illegal food enterprise will be useless, government-enterprise conspiracy will be common phenomenon.(4) Society multi-governance is the effective measure in governing food safety market. It could effectively promote the swift of government function; meanwhile it is an efficient solution to the relatively inadequate regulation force and the uneven dispersion of public service in regulating food safety.