Study On Government Purchase Of Public Transport Service Based On Game Theory

Public transport provides basic travel services for the public.The Ministry of State Construction put forward the "Public Transport Priority" in 2004.The development of public transport can meet the public's safe,convenient,efficient travel demands and ease traffic congestion.Public transport service is a typical quasi-public product and commonweal,so it requires the government to make financial compensation for public transport enterprises due to the loss of public welfare.Under the traditional public transport financial subsidy mechanism,there is information asymmetry between the government and public transport enterprises.The efficiency of public transport finance compensation funds is low,the government's financial burden is too heavy,and the quality of public transport service is also not satisfactory.Therefore,how to improve the efficiency of public transport supply and the quality of public transport service,and reduce the financial burden of the government has become the focus of the society at present.The government purchase of public transport service is an effective solution.This thesis firstly studies the characteristics of public transport service.It finds that the public transport service as a quasi-public product and its externality will lead to market failure,and then analyzes the existing problems in traditional public transport financial subsidy mechanism,puts forward the rationality of government purchase of public transport service and its operating mechanism.Through the analysis of game relationships between the passengers,government and public transport enterprises in the government purchase of public transport service,it finds in the purchase process the pursuit of the goal of the three is inconsistent and information is not entirely symmetrical,and also around the purchase amount to start the game,so consider the establishment of game model to solve the government purchase of public transport service equilibrium.Due to the existence of double principal-agent relationships between the passengers,government and public transport enterprises in the purchase process,this thesis constructs the government purchase basic game model of double principal-agent relation based on the maximum social benefits as the objective function,and also considering the participation constraint and incentive compatibility constraint of public transport enterprises.Then,the thesis considers that under the traditional public transport financial subsidy mechanism,the government cannot get the true operation cost of the public transport enterprises and the quality of public transport service is low,so the government can set strict service and cost supervision assessment system,and evaluate the level of efforts of public transport enterprises by entrusting the third party supervision and evaluation institutions to encourage public transport enterprises to reduce the operation cost and improve the quality of public transport service.Therefore,it adds bonus penalty coefficient to the basic model,removes the incentive compatibility constraint,and reconstructs the game model of government purchase under the supervision of service and cost,and use Kuhn Tucker condition to solve the optimal solution of the model.Finally,this thesis makes an empirical analysis of the game model by using the relevant data of the Chongqing municipal government to purchase bus service in 2016,then finds out when it reaches the maximum social benefits,Chongqing municipal government expects the level of efforts to be achieved by public transport enterprises and the purchase amount of payment.Furthermore,it confirms the government purchase of public transport service under the supervision of service and cost is an effective supply pattern for the development of public transport.