Research On The Correlation Between The Performance Of Listed Companies And Executive Compensation

As an important part of human resource management in modern enterprises,the salary design has been the focus of attention both at home and abroad sine 1980 s.The separation of ownership and management of modern enterprises causes the contradiction between the principal and the agent,which leads to the occurrence of agency cost.Therefore,the issue of compensation incentive for senior management of enterprise resources is attracting more and more attention from all walks of life.In recent years,there are many studies on the correlation between executive compensation and company performance at home and abroad.There are many studies from different angles,but there is no consistent conclusion.This article studies the relationship between executive monetary compensation,shareholding ratio and the company's short-term performance and long-term performance from the perspective of property rights,which not only enriched the theory of China's listed companies compensation theory,and how to design the salary incentive mechanism has certain practical significance.This paper selects the Shanghai and Shenzhen 2014-2016 A-share listed company data,by using the methods of literature research and empirical research,qualitative research and quantitative research,combined with the use of SPSS software,respectively study the correlation between executive monetary compensation,managerial ownership and company's long-term and short-term performance from the perspective of property rights.In order to study whether the short-term performance of the company has a lag effect on the executive monetary remuneration,a regression analysis is made for the executive monetary remuneration after a year.The research finds that:(1)the executive monetary compensation is positively related to the company's long and short term performance in state-owned enterprises,and the executives monetary compensation is also positively correlated with the company's long and short term performance in non-state-owned enterprises.(2)The correlation between executive shareholding ratio and long and short term performance is not significant in state-owned enterprises.There is no significant correlation between the executive monetary compensation and the short-term performance of the company,which is significantly positively related to the long-term performance of the company in non-state-owned listed companies.(3)The executive compensation is mainly determined by the short-term performance level of the company this year,but it will also refer to the performance level of the previous year in China's state-owned enterprises.However,the monetary compensation of top executives is mainly determined by the short-term performance level of the company in the previous year in China's non-state-owned enterprises.The innovation of this article lies in:(1)the domestic and foreign scholars for the company performance index or not subdivide,or will be divided into market performance and accounting performance,however,little research on corporate performance is divided into short-term and long-term performance,the corporate performance is divided into short-term and long-term performance in this article.(2)In order to increase the accuracy of the research results,the data are analyzed by the state-owned and non state-owned enterprises from the perspective of property rights.