Ownership Structure And Agency Cost Of Listed Companies

Corporate governance plays an important role in the operation of the company.Corporate governance stems from agency costs,and the reduction of agency costs is the basic goal of corporate governance.With the deepening of the research on corporate governance,scholars have carried out extensive research on the agency cost of different ownership structures,and there are great differences in the research conclusions due to the different research perspectives,methods and data.In China,there is a general control of the large shareholders under the centralized stock right.After the split share reform,the governance environment has changed.The agency conflict between the large and small shareholders has become the focus of the corporate governance,and the protection of the rights and interests of the small and medium shareholders needs to be paid attention to.Based on the theory of principal-agent and the theory of information asymmetry,the paper draws on the latest research results of control structure and agency cost at home and abroad,and studies the relationship between the control structure and the agency cost through theoretical analysis and literature analysis.Secondly,through empirical analysis and testing the relationship between the two,the control structure of the single large shareholders is divided into single control large shareholders and single non control large shareholders.From the perspective of R&D efficiency,the non balanced panel data of the listed companies of A shares for 2010-2015 years are used to analyze the three types of the independent sample mean difference test.The size of the agency cost of the listed companies of type control(single control large shareholder,single non-control large shareholder and multiple non-control large shareholder),using the fixed effect model,difference in differences model(DID)and other empirical analysis models to analyze the influence of three types of control rights on agency cost,and finally establish property rights and control of property rights.The interaction item of the structure of the right structure studies the influence of the control structure on agency cost under different property rights.The conclusions are as follows:(1)the agency cost of a single controlling shareholder is the lowest.(2)the agency cost of a single uncontrolled large shareholder is in the middle.(3)the agency costs of several non controlling large shareholders are the highest.(4)the property property has a positive regulating effect on the effect of the control right structure of a single non control large shareholder on the effect of the agency cost,and has a negative regulating effect on the effect of the control structure of a single controlling shareholder on the effect of the agency cost.The innovation of this article is as follows:(1)The agency cost measurement index innovation of control structure allocation.There are few researches on the cost of control allocation agent under the control of large shareholders.There are two main directions on the measurement of agency cost.One is to measure the efficiency loss or extra expenditure of the enterprise,such as the rate of management cost and the rate of operating expenses,and the two is based on the perspective of cash flow.The higher business performance often reflects the lower agency cost,and the lower operating performance reflects the company's higher agency cost.The research under this perspective uses growth,pre tax profit and other indicators.In this paper,the first measurement method is adopted,and the efficiency of R & D is selected as the substitute index for the efficiency of the company to measure the size of the agency cost.(2)Research perspective innovation.At present,the research on the efficiency of the internal governance of the company mostly stays in the ownership structure characteristics,such as the ownership concentration,the balance of equity,the separation of the two rights and so on,and seldom involves the research based on the control right perspective.Based on the control of large shareholders,this paper analyzes the effect of control allocation on the R & D efficiency of enterprises,and tests the effect of the allocation of control rights on R & D efficiency of the listed companies through empirical research.