The Research Of The Relation Between The Ownership Structure And Agency Cost In China's Family-control Listed Companies

The thesis surveys the academic researches on Agency Cost of Ultimate Controlling Shareholder and then analyzes the Agency Cost of Ultimate Controlling Shareholder in China's Family-control listed companies. Empirical results from big sample show that the bigger the separation of ultimate ownership and control, the lower the Corporate Value, it suggests that the agency problems of ultimate controlling shareholder do exist in China's Family-control listed companies; the bigger the separation of ultimate ownership and control, the lower the Dividend Policy, the result suggest that cash dividend just is a means of stealing wealth of minority shareholders employed by ultimate controlling shareholder; the bigger the separation of ultimate ownership and control, the higher the rate of Related-Party Transaction, These results suggest that ultimate controlling shareholder employ related-party transactions as a means of transferring firm resource and of stealing wealth of minority shareholders; but the Earnings Management have no significant impact with the separation of ultimate ownership and control. Thses show that Cash Dividend and Related-Party Transaction are means of transferring firm resource and of expropriating minority shareholders used by Ultimate Controlling Shareholder. According to the research results, the paper puts forward the policy suggestions to enhance Chinese listed corporates' value from the angle of agency costs.