Research On The Relationship Among Information Disclosure Quality,Agency Cost And Cash Dividend Distribution

The cash dividend distribution policy of listed companies is an important form of reTurns to investors,which can enhance the investment function of capital market and enhance the attractiveness of capital market.However,cash dividends in China's listed companies are not continuous and not stable,the dividend reTurn mode is single,and the structure is not reasonable,which arouses the concern of the market and scholars.Information disclosure as a bridge between listed companies and investors,on the one hand,can replace cash dividend distribution to deliver information to the market.On the other hand,information disclosure can improve the information transparency of listed companies to suppress the"tunneling",which can force listed companies to distribute cash dividend.In order to study the real relationship between the quality of information disclosure and cash dividend distribution in China's capital market,this paper takes empirical research based on the efficient market hypothesis,principal-agent theory and signaling theory,and takes the influence of agency cost into account.This paper chooses the listed companies of Shenzhen A-share market in 2012-2016 as the research sample,and validates the relationship among the quality of information disclosure,the cost of agency and the distribution of cash dividends.It is found that the quality of information disclosure of listed companies in China is positively correlated with cash dividend distribution Relationship,and the agency costs have a positive effect on this relationship.For the further study,this paper respectively analyses of the data in main board,SME board and the GEM.It is found that the positive correlation of information disclosure and cash dividend distribution is more significant in SME board,followed by the motherboard,and the GEM listed companies more relevant Weak;the positive role of the agency cost is also more obvious in SME board while this regulatory role does not reflect in the GEM.The empirical results show that improving the quality of information disclosure can relieve the information asymmetry under the background of semi mandatory dividend system in our country.This means investors can know more about the listed companies so that they can supervise listed companies better.The result confirms the foreign scholar Paul Brockman's view,he believes that the information environment has a positive effect on the dividend policy.In the Chinese stock market,listed companies in SME board are relatively small and generally in the traditional manufacturing industry,and they lack of investment opportunities and have more free cash flow,so the positive correlation between the quality of information disclosure and dividend distribution is more obvious,and the agency cost plays a more important role in the correlation.Listed companies in motherboard are large and mature,the relationship is weaker than companies in SME.Currently,GEM market in China is not mature,generally take a positive dividend policy,so the correlation of between information disclosure quality and the cash dividend distribution in GEM is weak,and agency cost does not play a role in the regulation.According to the conclusion,this paper proposed to strengthen the construction of information disclosure of SME,listed companies which have serious agency problem should improve the quality of information disclosure and accept the supervision of investors.For the listed companies in GEM,the first problem is to solve the agency problem.