Research On Cash Dividend Policy And Equity Agency Cost Of The Chinese Listed Companies

Early research on corporate governance focused on the traditional agency problem, namely, highly dispersed ownership as a result of the agency problem between shareholders and managers. More recently, some scholars found that the vast majority of our listed companies is derived from the state-owned enterprise reform, the structure of corporate governance is neither different from the Anglo-American model of decentralized ownership structure, but also different from the high concentration of ownership that cross-holdings of Japan, Germany, model, and One share dominates exclusively in the control mode.there are minority shareholders and major shareholders of the dual agency relationship in the mode.Major listed companies in a conflict of interest reflected in the large shareholders and managers, minority shareholders and large shareholders, shareholder rights protection has become the world securities market theory and practice focus of attention, so how to reduce a double agent under the agency Cost (ie, equity agency costs first and second class options agency costs) became the focus of corporate governance research.As early as 1956, Lintner on classical literature said that stable cash dividends are very important in the company policy. In this regard, the agency cost theory of dividend think that the payment of cash dividends reduce the free cash flow by the control of shareholders or management, and in the financing process receive more external oversight, which can reduce equity agency costs.Based on this, the paper firstly in the domestic and foreign research based on the review of literature, expounds related theory about the dividend policy and agency problems, analyses the current situation of the cash dividend and the background of the agency, with the actual situation puts forward assumption. using data from listed companies in China, analyze the stability of dividend policy on the impact of two types of equity agency costs, and concluded: first. the influence on the company's first Class of equity agency costs of the stability of cash dividends is significant positive; second, the influence on the company's second Class of equity agency costs of the stability of cash dividends is significant positive; third, the first and second option does not exist between the agency cost trade-off Negative correlation, but there is decreasing with the increase with a significant positive correlation; forth, in out country,the company with steady cash dividend and higher payment level, can reduce the equity agency cost.This paper argues it is very necessary that Government make reasonable laws and regulations for the steady and high dividend policy of listed companies in China, it will effectively alleviate the double specially agency conflicts, that is the agency problems between management and shareholders will decrease, and will reduce the cost of the first class of equity agency, but also the agency problems between the biggest shareholders and minority shareholders will decrease, and will reduce the cost of the second class of equity.