Force Local Government To Perform Responsibilities In The Overall Planning Of Urban Workers' Basic Pension

Realizing the national overall planning for basic pensions for urban workers is the necessary way to maintain the financial sustainability and fairness of the basic endowment insurance system for urban workers.The "Twelfth Five-Year Plan" proposed to implement the national overall planning for urban worker's basic pensions during the planning period,and the "Thirteenth Five-Year Plan" and report of 19th CPC National Congress emphasized itagain.To realize this policy goal and promote the fund's adjustments throughout the country requires the central government and local government to perform their duties and cooperate with each other.Based on the analysis of many literatures,this paper argues that the interest game behavior of local governmentswho escape from their responsibilities is the main reason for slow process of overall planning.However,starting from the nature of the basic products of basic pension and the economic functions of local governments,local governments are responsible for the urban worker's basic pension.To sort out the evasive tactics that may be adopted by local governments in the overall planning,and to prescribe the right medicine is a good way to get rid of the game behavior of local governments.Based on the theory of public choice theory,this paper regards both the central government and local government as "economic man",and its action goal is to maximize its own utility.Using the "Boxed pig game" non-reciprocal game model to analyze the tactical choice process of the local government in the implementation of the overall planning,it is concluded that whether the central government subsidizes or not,the evasion of responsibility is the best choice for local government with surplus under consideration of returns,while the central government does not have an optimal strategy and can only make choice reacting to local government's strategies.Therefore,in order to ensure the implementation of the policy,it is an inevitable choice for the central government to enforce the local government to perform the responsibility.Then through the analysis of similar cases of comfortable housing and environmental pollution control,conclude the fleeing tactics that may be adopted by the local government in the implementation of the overall planning policy implementation,such as perfunctory implementation,replacement implementation,and execution of losses,which may greatly reduce the policy effect.Under the unitary system administrative system in China,the central government has dominant dominance over local governments.This administrative system in turn determines the characteristics of“High advancement" in the implementation of public policies in China.The central government will play an important role in promoting policy implementation.Therefore,from the perspective of the central government,it is of practical significance to study how to force local governments to perform their responsibilities,to avoid evasions by local governments,and to promote the successful implementation of policies.However,in the early,middle and late stages of policy implementation,the central government will face certain obstacles.In order to ensure smooth implementation of the central government's coercion,this paper proposes a comprehensive implementation path based on the obstacles it faces:pre-perfect the top-level design of the system,clearly divide the responsibilities between the central government and local government,improve the inter-government fiscal system,and standardize the inter-governmental transfer payments system;in-strengthen the administrative supervision mechanism and establish a smooth level coordination mechanism;later-establish a policy implementation evaluation system and reform the performance evaluation mechanism.