Research On Supply Chain Pricing Decision Under Asymmetric Fairness Preference

In the past,a lot of researches on supply chain decision-making are based on that subject is completely rational,but current research hot spot in this field is considering that subject is completely irrational,and among those completely irrational factors fairness preference get the most attention.Actually,preference types of behavioral subjects are various.For example,behavioral subject is likely to be self-interested or may be with fairness preference,ignoring either of this two preference types is incomplete,and preference type information of one subject is actually asymmetric for others.The present researches mainly focus on information symmetry case but ignore information asymmetry state.Furthermore,as for a handful of researches which considered fairness preference information asymmetry,it didn't put forward any specific screening contract for the party who are in disadvantageous information situation to identify the real preference type of other members,it also did not compare the influences of the same information asymmetry state on decisions of different preference types of subjects.Accordingly,the main contents of this paper are as follows:In the first place,assuming that retailer is with fairness preference which is asymmetric information and manufacture is purely selfish.The results show that when retailer's fairness distribution coefficient and fairness preference strength are relatively weak,selfish manufacturer should provide a separate contract,and retailer's fairness preference will affect the optimal decisions and benefits of supply chain members under this condition;in the remaining cases,selfish manufacture should provide a pool contract,and fairness preference does not necessarily affect members' decisions and benefits now.Comparison analysis shows that the optimal wholesale price and retail price under information asymmetry are higher than that under information symmetry,but the optimal gains of manufacturer and retailer under information asymmetry are less than that under information symmetry,asymmetric information is adverse to both of manufacturer and retailer.Next,considering that retailer is with fairness preference which is also asymmetric information and at the same time manufacture is with fairness preference.The results show that when retailer's fairness distribution coefficient and fairness preference strength are relatively weak,fair manufacturer should provide a separate contract,and all of fairness preference factors will affect members' optimal decisions and benefitsunder this condition;otherwise fair manufacturer should provide two different pool contracts according to retailer' different fairness distribution coefficient and fairness preference strength,and fairness preference does not necessarily affect members' decisions and benefits now.The results of numerical simulation show that manufacturer's expected utility under information asymmetry definitely less than that under information symmetry,information asymmetry must be disadvantageous to fair manufacturer.Finally,comparing and analyzing the optimal decisions' differences of different preference types of manufactures who are in the same asymmetric information situation,the results show that under asymmetric information circumstance,selfish manufacture should design one separate contract and one pool contract to identify retailer's real preference type information,but fair manufacturer have to design one separate contract and two different pool contracts to achieve this purpose.Moreover,the separate contracts' design of selfish and fair manufacture are different in contracts' contents,and the pool contracts' design of this two types of manufactures are different in contracts' contents or in its designing conditions.Therefore,the influence of same information asymmetry situation on the optimal decisions of different preference types of manufacturers is different.