Research On Supply Chain Strategic Inventory Coordination Considering Manufacturer's Promotion And Retailers' Competition

In this paper,we analyze the two-cycle supply chain coordination problems of "one manufacturer-one retailer" and "one manufacturer-two retailers" channels and retailers store strategic inventory.The focus of the study is on retailers storing strategic inventory to control how does the manufacturer's second-cycle wholesale price channel achieve coordination? We have considered factors such as manufacturer sales promotion and retailers competition,and calculated the decision variables of each member of the channel and the changes in the optimal profit of each party.The study found that: in the two-cycle supply chain where retailers compete,using the contract incentive mechanism of manufacturer's promotion will achieve the purpose of reducing the strategic inventory in the supply chain and the further coordination of the entire channel.Finally,we verify the correctness of the conclusion through the example analysis.In the first part of the paper,we established three decision-making methods: centralized decision-making,decentralized decision-making,and contract incentives for manufacturer promotions.The study found that in a retailer-led decentralized decisionmaking,retailers do not choose to store strategic inventory;in a manufacturer-led decentralized decision,retailers choose to store strategic inventory after the end of the first cycle in order to the cycle controls the manufacturer's wholesale price,which leads to a reduction in the total profit of the supply chain.Based on this,we propose a contract incentive mechanism for manufacturers' promotion.At this time,the retailer's strategic inventory is reduced.The wholesale price in each cycle is greater than the wholesale price in decentralized decision-making,and the profits of manufacturers and retailers are greater than those of retailers.Profit at the time of decision-making has realized the coordination of the supply chain system.In the second part of the paper,we further introduced the retailer's competition factors and studied the changes of channels in the context of "one manufacturer-two retailers".The study found that in a manufacturer-led decentralized decision-making process,the retailer's two-cycle product order quantity is accompanied by an increase in the degree of competition between retailers;and as the intensity of competition increases,the difference between the retailer's order quantity in two cycles is getting smaller and smaller,and eventually reaches a consensus.At the same time,the total profits of the entire channel and the profits of manufacturers have also increased with the increase of the fierce competition.However,the profits of retailers and the amount of strategic stocks held at the end of the first cycle have followed.However,in the retailer-led decentralized decision-making,when a competitive retailer is introduced into the channel,the retailer will no longer use the zero-strategy inventory strategy for maximizing its own interests.When a manufacturer conducts a promotion,the manufacturer sells the product to the retailer at a higher wholesale price,and the retailer also orders more products in two cycles respectively;the retailer selects at the end of the first cycle.The amount of strategic stocks stored will be reduced,and the goal of manufacturer's promotion contract to reduce retailers' strategic inventory will be realized;from the perspective of the profits of each member of the channel,when the manufacturer carries out promotional activities,the profit of the manufacturer is greater than that of the non-promotion.The profit of a retailer is also greater than that of a non-promotional sale.At this time,achieving a win-win situation for both sides of the channel is conducive to the coordination of channels,and it is of practical significance for the manufacturer to carry out promotional activities.