Controlled In Advance Of The Supply And Demand Sides Stackelberg Game And Coordination

With today's rapidly development of information technology and the change of customers' various and individual demand, the Time-Based Competition (TBC) has become the leading strategy in more and more industries. In the traditional supply chain's models, lead-time was considered as an exogenous and uncontrollable variable. But it has been changed by the practice of JIT. We began to consider lead-time as a controllable endogenetic variable. So, many scholars and companies began to focus on the problem of the controllable lead-time in supply chain management field.A two-level supply chain system consists of single vendor and single purchaser with controllable lead-time is studied in this thesis. We apply the Game theory and Bi-level Programming to the inventory decision making problem under the consideration in the interaction of the supplier and retailer. For lack of consideration in the interaction of the supplier and retailer in previous research, lead-time is expressed by the controllable variables of both two parties. Therefore, the optimal lead-time will be derived from their joint decisions. These are the innovations of our thesis.This article mainly contains the following four parts:i) The study on extending the optimization of single level to two-level supply chain system consists of vendor and purchaser under a lot-for-lot policy.ii) The study on the reduction of setup time and setup cost under a lot-for-lot policy.iii) The optimal decision-making of supplier and retailer with equal sized batch shipments by extending the lot-for-lot policy.iv) Considering the equal and unequal sized batch shipments between supplier and retailer.Based on the four aspects, we establish Stackelberg game models that the supplier and the retailer are dominated respectively in the supply chain as well as inventory models of integrated and coordinative supply chain. The production rate improving, optimized safety stock and stock out cost are taken into consideration simultaneously. Different methods are presented according to each mathematical model. Then, the impacts on the best decisions and total costs for the supplier and retailer are investigated in the numerical example. And we propose a supply chain coordination mechanism in the end of each order model.We gain the following conclusion from the results at the end of this thesis: some given parameters in traditional literatures are considered as decision variables and controlled and the decisions of the supplier and retailer are optimized by our models. We can shorten the lead-time, lower the setup cost and safety stock and reduce the total cost of supply chain and the members. In addition, with the comparison of the Game models and integrated supply chain model, it is demonstrated that we get the systematic optimal state instead of both two parties benefit from it in the integrated supply chain model. In the end, our thesis proposes a coordination mechanism of the cost allocation to inspire the participators to accept the cooperative strategy and achieve the win-win target.