An Empirical Study On The Causes Of Performance Difference In Equipment Manufacturing Under Different Property Rights Characteristics

On June 9,2015,Xi Jinping has pointed out that “large state-owned enterprises” occupied a dominant position in key industries and areas related to national security and the lifeblood of the national economy,and they were important pillars of the national economy.However,compared with private enterprises,state-owned enterprises are large in scale but not strong enough,and most large-scale state-owned enterprises rely on a deep background of resource monopoly and price monopoly.Based on the theory of property rights,this paper analyzes the effect property rights on performance through external transaction costs and internal agency costs,while the external transaction costs cannot be accurately measured and the standards of indicators are different.Therefore,this paper analyzes the reasons for the differences in performance of state-owned and private enterprises caused by the agency cost.This paper takes the financial data of listed equipment manufacturing companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2012 to 2016 as sample data,some of which have been collected manually.Based on the theory of property rights,according to which property rights affect performance through agency costs,this paper,guided by the principle that agency costs are the intermediary variables of property rights and performance,groups the whole sample,state-owned enterprises and private enterprises and obtains empirical results after correlation analysis and multiple regression.The research results show that the proportion of state-owned shares held by the whole sample is significantly negatively correlated with performance,and positively correlated with agency costs.That is to say,with higher proportion of state-owned shares,performance of state-owned enterprises is lower than that of private enterprises and the agency costs are higher than those of private enterprises.The intermediary effect of agency costs on the proportion of state-owned shares and performance indicates that the performance of state-owned enterprises is lower than that of private enterprises because the agency costs of enterprises are too high;the regression results in private enterprises are not significant because the proportion of state-owned share is lower with an average of around 1% which does not affect the performance of the company;there is a significant positive correlation between the proportion of state-owned shares held by the state-owned enterprises and performance,while the agency costs are not significant,because among state-owned enterprises those with high proportion of state-owned shares are mostly monopoly industries such as petroleum companies and tobacco companies,so that profits in this sector are relatively high while the performance of state-owned enterprises is generally lower than that of private enterprises.Thus,this paper reaches its conclusion and puts forward relevant policies and recommendations.