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Government Subsidy,Executive Stock Ownership And Corporate R&D Investment

Posted on:2018-04-08Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:W LiFull Text:PDF
GTID:2429330512488541Subject:Business management
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Carrying out innovation can gain sustainable competitive advantage for enterprises in the fierce market competition,and the majority of investors like the listed companies with continuous innovation and development ability.However,executives do not want to take the risk of R&D due to the uncertainty of research and development,high risk,long payback period and other characteristics,The equity incentive system has been widely adopted by enterprises because of its low cost and can effectively avoid the short-term behavior of managers.Currently China society's fiscal decentralization and political promotion largely prompted the local government to develop the local economy,and the local governments' attitude are more active in dealing with the enterprises for the sake of their own political interests.In order to promote local economic growth,the local government will intervene to enterprises in various forms,including government subsidies that the enterprise obtained from the hands of the government directly,and subsidies has an important impact on the current and future development of the business enterprise.Based on the exchange of interests,enterprises got government subsidies will bear more political costs in the pursuit of maximizing shareholder values.This paper selects China's GEM listed companies as research samples,and classified the category of government subsidies according to China Securities Regulatory Commission's regulation Listed Companies Information Disclosure Notice No.second-Disclosure of Government Subsidies in the Financial Statements.The results of this study include: first,there is a significant positive correlation between the proportion of managerial ownership and corporate R &D investment level in the companies listed on GEM,the results support the convergence of interest effect hypothesis;second,the government subsidies significantly regulate the relationship between executive ownership and corporate R&D investment;third,the moderating effect of government grants for assets on executive stock ownership and corporateR&D investment is not significant,and the government subsidy related to income positively regulates the relationship between executive stock ownership and R&D investment.
Keywords/Search Tags:Executive stock ownership, Enterprise R&D investment, Government subsidy, Growth enterprises market
PDF Full Text Request
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