Research On The Impact Of Government Subsidy On Supervisor Excess Payment Of Listed Companies In State-owned Enterprises

In China’s economic operation,state-owned enterprises as the backbone of the country,its governance level and the effectiveness of economic operations have an essential relationship.According to the optimal contract theory,reasonable and effective compensation companies can encourage executives to make efforts to improve the company’s performance,thus maximizing shareholder value.With the hot topic of “high price compensation” in the society,the government has also carried out a series of salary controls.However,since the introduction of the restricted salary order,the phenomenon of high-priced salaries of state-owned enterprise executives has still occurred from time to time.The company’s performance has been decoupled from executive compensation.Even enterprises have experienced the trend of remuneration against growth.The optimal contract theory has been questioned.To a certain extent,it explains the reason why the optimal contract is not excellent.To this end,based on China’s 2009 state-owned enterprise executive compensation system reform,this paper studies the impact of government subsidies on state-owned enterprise executives’ excess compensation,and conducts an in-depth analysis of the regulatory role of management power.For state-owned enterprises,they have a natural political connection with the government and have greater advantages than private enterprises to obtain government subsidies.For state-owned enterprise executives,because of the low cost or no cost of government subsidies,and the large amount of cash flow brought by government subsidies,it is easy for executives to generate speculative psychology and rent-seeking behavior.On the other hand,government subsidies are included in other income or non-operating income according to the accounting standards,which can polish the profits of the company.This makes it easier to influence the self-interested behavior of executives,which is ultimately reflected in executive compensation.This paper takes the data of state-owned listed companies in 2010-2017 as a sample,analyzes the ways for executives to obtain excess compensation,studies the impact on executive over-remuneration from government subsidies,and analyzes the regulatory role of management power.Further segmentation of the eastern region and the central and western regions based on regional factors,and comparative analysis of the impact of government subsidies on executive over-remuneration.The results of the study show that management power has a regulatory role,executive over-remuneration has a negative correlation with performance,management in the eastern region is more constrained,executives seek limited over-pay space,and executives in the central and western regions receive more excess compensation.The phenomenon is more obvious.It shows that the power of management plays an important role in the salary reform of state-owned enterprises in China.It is extremely urgent to strengthen the supervision role in the management of state-owned enterprises.It is necessary to continuously improve the corporate governance of the central and western regions.Through the combination of theoretical and empirical analysis,it finally proposes policy recommendations on the distribution of government subsidies,improving the efficiency of use,and corporate governance.