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DDoS Attack Defense Model Based On Stackelberg Game

Posted on:2021-02-01Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:X YangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2428330611951415Subject:Software engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Distributed denial of service(DDoS)attacks are considered as a major threat to network availability.On the one hand,the defense of DDoS attack is a project with unequal benefits and costs.The cost of building a defense system for a service's DDoS attack may be greater than the benefits brought by this service.On the other hand,because the network defender is in the clear and the attacker is in the dark,the attacker can observe the defense strategy of the defender in the dark and choose the right opportunity to launch the attack.These make DDoS attack defense more challenging.In heterogeneous networks,the defender can actively detect DDoS attacks by installing an intrusion detection system for network devices.In recent years,through observing the detection threshold set by the defender for the intrusion detection system,the attacker takes strategic attacks with different attack intensities according to the importance and detection threshold of the device,so as to achieve the maximum total attack revenue.In Chapter 3,we model the confrontation between defenders and attackers in heterogeneous networks as a Stackelberg game model.Then the algorithm is used to solve the optimal defense strategy of the defender.Finally,the simulation wireless sensor network is built by NS-3 to evaluate the model and defense strategy.Analysis of the experimental results shows that the model in this paper is more practical for the strategic DDoS attack in heterogeneous networks,and the defense strategy in this paper is obviously better than the other two basic defense strategies.Some high-value servers are also important targets of DDoS attacks,such as bank servers and third-party payment servers.For those clients who are sensitive to DDoS attack risk,they are willing to pay for stable services and fixed bandwidth.Therefore,in Chapter 4,the risk of DDoS attack is included in the pricing problem of server bandwidth for the first time,and the problem of server and user about the pricing of exclusive bandwidth is modeled as Stackelberg game model,and then the method of solving the optimal total amount and unit price of exclusive bandwidth is proposed.Finally,a large number of experiments show that the proposed model makes the server's profit higher than the other two existing models.
Keywords/Search Tags:DDoS Attack, Game Theory, Intrusion Detection System, Bandwidth Pricing
PDF Full Text Request
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