Performance Forecast Correction?Media Coverage And Major Shareholder Reduction

In August 2005,China carried out the equity division reform.China's capital market gradually entered the era of full circulation.The large-scale reduction of the company's major shareholders in the secondary market is increasing,which has attracted frequent attention from external investors and regulators.As a major shareholder who holds important or even unpublished information of the company,whether or not it will use the information advantage to "accurately reduce its holdings" to seek private interests has aroused concern and doubts from all walks of life.At the same time,the frequent occurrence of earnings violations by listed companies has caused stock prices to ride a "roller coaster." Whether a major shareholder with inside information will use the company's face change notice to obtain excess returns on time trading is the focus of this study.On the other hand,with the rapid development of the information age,the media has become an important cause of affecting the company's stock price.Studies have shown that there may be active management of media reporting during the company's major events.Whether or not the company's major shareholders will also choose media as a tool to influence stock prices during the performance forecast violation period,and disclose media management.These are the main issues to be discussed in this paper.This paper takes the major shareholder reduction events before and after the violation of the performance forecast of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2017 as the research object to explore whether there is speculation in major shareholder reduction and the disclosure management of media by major shareholders.The study found that large shareholders do have speculative behavior and tend to reduce their holdings after the company publishes good news notices of violations,and reduce their holdings before the bad news notices violations;Moreover,the larger the number of violations of the performance forecast in the forecast,the larger the size of the major shareholder reduction;At the same time,major shareholders have different performance on media management during the violation of performance forecasting of different nature,that is,they tend to manage media disclosure during bad news,but there is no such tendency during good news.This paper enriches the literature on the speculative behavior and information disclosure of major shareholders,and has a certain theoretical and practical significance for understanding the law of company information disclosure and improving corporate governance and supervising media reports.