Study On Major Shareholders's Tunneling Of Backdoor Listing Company

Up to now,listed companies have been a very important part of China's capital market,but according to relevant data,in the past decade,there were still some of the capital loss in China's securities market is caused by the tunneling behavior of major shareholders of listed companies.Despite a series of laws and regulations issued by the regulatory authorities,there are some improvements in the legal supervision and management and the improvement of corporate governance structure,but the tunneling behavior of major shareholders is still prohibited repeatedly.With the increasingly concealed means of tunneling,it is difficult for auditing institutions to discover the illegal act of encroaching on the rights and interests of minority shareholders,and harming the interests of listed companies at the beginning of the tunneling behavior of major shareholders in listed companies.Usually,the tunneling behavior is exposed only when the stock price of listed companies falls sharply or the normal operation is not maintained.Based on this situation,it is particularly necessary to further study the tunneling behavior of major shareholders of listed companies.Taking the listed company Protruly(Securities Code: 600074)as an example,this paper combs the research results of domestic and foreign experts and scholars on the large shareholders' tunneling behavior of backdoor listed companies by using three methods: literature research,case study and event study,and takes principal-agent theory and private benefits theory of control as the theoretical basis to analyze Protruly,which is a specific case of shareholder tunneling.Firstly,the basic situation of Protruly,the tunneling incident of major shareholders and the economic consequences are analyzed in detail.Secondly,the paper analyses the means adopted by the major shareholders of Protruly and the reasons for the tunneling behavior.Finally,in view of the specific case of large shareholder tunneling company after Protruly backdoor listing,this paper puts forward some suggestions on reducing the tunneling behavior of large shareholders of backdoor listed companies from both internal and external aspects.The results show that the tunneling behavior of Protrulymajor shareholders has serious economic consequences,resulting in a sharp drop in the stock price of listed companies and a serious loss in the company's operating performance,which has a negative impact on both small and medium investors and listed companies.The main ways of tunneling out Protruly by major shareholders include using false agreement to falsely increase evaluation value,falsely high value of foreign investment,illegal huge foreign investment,large amount of prepaid accounts,and illegal implementation of employee equity incentives.The main conditions for the tunneling behavior of Protruly's major shareholders are that the ownership structure is too centralized,the internal governance mechanism is imperfect,the internal control has major defects,the implementation of external supervision measures is inadequate,and the supervision of intermediary agencies is not in place.Based on theoretical and case studies,this paper puts forward some suggestions from the internal and external perspectives to prevent major shareholders from tunneling and protect the interests of listed companies,small or medium investors.