Research On The Legal Regulation Of The Resale Of Shares Of Shareholders And Directors Of Listed Companies In China

Since the completion of the reform of non-tradable shares in China,the stock market has ushered in an era of great expansion.In addition,the emergence of financial investors and emerging new financing methods together cause a reduction tide of major shareholders of listed companies and specific shareholders as well as high commissioners.It should be the right of market participants to buy and sell shares freely in the secondary market.However,the reduction of holding behavior of the above mentioned subjects shows different degree of harmfulness from that of ordinary medium and small investors.Therefore,from the purpose of maintaining the fairness and order of the securities market and protecting the small and medium investors,it is of great significance to guide the major shareholders,specific shareholders and the director of the board of directors of listed companies to reduce their stock holdings in a standard and orderly way.On May 26,2017,China securities regulatory commission(CSRC)issued the newly revised "several provisions on the reduction of shares held by shareholders and directors of listed companies",and then the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges issued relevant implementation rules.Undoubtedly like a dose of medicine in a short period of time it does play a plug underweight wave effect.More than a year later,empirical analysis is needed to test the long-term operation effect of the new regulation on reducing holdings.In the first chapter,the author collects and analyzes the cases of regulation of CSRC and Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges in the past two years.It is concluded that the illegal reduction behaviors in the past two years have exposed such characteristics as the difficulty in identification by the people acting in unison,the sharp increase in the number of illegal reduction of stock pledge,and the increasing demand for reduction by financial investors.In the second chapter,this paper studies the behavior of "routine reduction of holdings" which is beyond the constraint of existing rules but has aroused widespread concern in the market.The author concludes that there are still some deficiencies in the current legal regulations on the behavior of shareholders and directors of listed companies in China,that is,the securities market rules have not been systematically constructed,the legal liability for illegal reduction of holdings is relatively light,the rules for regulating reduction of holdings have not formed a system,and the legal regulations on "routine reduction of holdings" are missing.The third chapter demonstrates that reasonable regulation of the behavior of shareholders and the director of the board of directors in reducing their holdings can maintain the stability of the securities market,guide the concept of value investment,reduce the agency cost of the director of the board of directors in reducing their holdings,and prevent insider trading.Therefore,it is reasonable to regulate the behavior of major shareholders,specific shareholders and the director of the board of directors in reducing their holdings.In the last chapter,aiming at the deficiencies mentioned in the second chapter,this paper puts forward suggestions on how to systematically construct securities market rules,increase the legal liabilities of those who violate the rules and systematically construct regulatory rules for reducing securities holdings.In addition,it also puts forward regulatory assumptions around four types of "routine reduction" behaviors.