Managerial Power,Party Organization Governance And Perquisite Consumption

In the new era of economic transformation and upgrading,state-owned enterprises have entered an important stage of high-quality development,but the problem of on-the-job consumption of senior executives has brought great troubles to them.In promoting the reform of wage determination mechanism,state-owned enterprises always adhere to the unity of benefit orientation and maintenance of equity in order to reduce invisible consumption.However,due to the lack of effective external supervision and internal constraints,managers use their power to manipulate remuneration and pursue their own private gains and personal consumption,which goes against the original intention of the remuneration reform.Abuse of power not only reduces the operational efficiency of enterprises,but also causes great loss of reputation to state-owned enterprises.In order to solve the problem of on-the-job consumption of senior executives,the government issued a number of opinions to regulate and guide the compensation system and job consumption of senior executives,to intervene politically from outside the enterprise,and to strengthen the supervision function of the government and shareholders.As an important part of the internal governance structure and a unique way of political intervention,Party organizations in state-owned enterprises play a key role in politics,which can have an important impact on corporate behavior,produce synergistic effects with external supervision,and achieve all-round supervision.However,as the greatest advantage and characteristic of state-owned enterprises,can the participation of Party organizations in corporate governance restrain the self-interest of management? Faced with the new situation of mixed ownership reform and Classified Governance of state-owned enterprises,it has certain theoretical and practical value to study the root of on-the-job consumption,the path and governance effect of Party organizations.High perquisite consumption is the product of power rent-seeking by management,can party organization participating in corporate governance become an important balance force that restricts Managerial power? This paper,based on the sample of the state-owned listed companies of A shares from 2007 to 2016,empirically analyses the influence mechanism of managerial power on executive consumption,and examines the regulatory effect of Party Organization Governance on this mechanism in combination with the current institutionalenvironment of the party organization into corporate governance.The study found that the expansion of managerial power can increase the executive consumption;the participation of Party organizations in corporate governance can reduce executive consumption;at the same time,the governance of Party organization negatively regulates the promotion function of managerial power to executive consumption.The conclusion shows that the managerial power is an important factor affecting the executive consumption,and it also clarifies the governance effect of the party organization,and provides a reasonable scientific theoretical and empirical basis for playing the governance role of the state-owned enterprise party organization,restricting the executive power and restraining perquisite consumption.The main contributions of this paper are as follows: Firstly,from the perspective of Party organization governance,this paper analyzes its role in the on-the-job consumption of state-owned listed companies,and provides a new perspective for the salary constraint of state-owned listed companies in China.Secondly,the innovation lies in how to restrain the expansion effect of managerial power on on-the-job consumption from the perspective of the combination of macro policy background and micro corporate governance,that is,the interaction between management power and party organization governance.Finally,it has played a complementary role to the current research on the on-the-job consumption of senior managers,and broadened the research field of the state-owned enterprise party organizations’ participation in corporate governance,and confirmed its inhibition on the positive correlation between managerial power and on-the-job consumption.According to the empirical results and research conclusions,this paper puts forward the following suggestions and measures for the governance mechanism of state-owned enterprises: First,improve the corporate governance structure,optimize the top design of corporate governance;Secondly,improve information disclosure and the incentive and restraint mechanism of executives;thirdly,strengthen the leadership of Party organizations,promote the participation of Party organizations in governance,and give full play to the internal governance effect of Party organizations.