A Process Theory Of Wisdom

For epistemologists,‘wisdom' can be conceptualized as the highest epistemic achievement--that is,as the achievement with the highest epistemic value.From this perspective,I plan to theorize wisdom.I will conclude that,so far,most philosophers have treated wisdom as a special kind of belief justified externally.However,I contend that wisdom could also be regarded as a special kind of epistemic process.And I believe philosophers ought to focus more on the latter sense.We should emphasize how wise people produce epistemic results that could be accepted as wisdom,rather than what wise people should know or understand in order to prove their wisdom.Wisdom in this technical,epistemological sense is very similar to the construct of ‘wisdom' that has triggered much heated discussion in psychology,education and gerontology in recent years.However,I hold that,due to the lack of undoubted figures of wisdom as objects of research,it would be too demanding for empirical studies to surpass partial views of wisdom and arrive at a synoptic theory.Besides,when we use ‘wise' to describe someone,we,in fact,assume a consensus between the perspective of the individual treated as wise and the public perspective of others.Nevertheless,empirical studies show that there's a tendency for empirical theories of wisdom to result in the separation of first-person perspective and third-person perspective judgments,which means that those who think themselves as wise may not be acknowledged as such by others,vice versa.Last but not least,there is also a need to study the normative dimension of wisdom.We would like to have an explanation of the reason why wisdom is superior to ordinary knowledge.And empirical research doesn't seem able to offer such an explanation.I maintain that an adequate study of wisdom must 1.reach a synoptic theory,2.harmonize judgments in the first person and the third person and 3.illuminate the normative dimension of wisdom.I find philosophical analysis more adequate for completing these three tasks.Therefore,I am not going to rely heavily on empirical work on wisdom but approach this topic philosophically.On the other hand,I anticipate that my results could help empirical studies to get over these three difficulties.There are three levels of discussion in philosophical theories of wisdom,focusing on three different but related subjects: 1.the epistemic character-trait,2.the epistemic object and 3.the application of the epistemic object.I will point out that,considering these three subjects,a theory of wisdom should: 1.accommodate different epistemic traits,2.delimit the epistemic objects for wise people,and 3.(1)require wise people to have dispositions to act,corresponding to their epistemic content,while(2)requiring those who apply the epistemic result of wise people to be able to reliably achieve the epistemic aim set for wisdom under ordinary circumstances.Based on these three levels of discussion,some theorists try to divide wisdom into two kinds: theoretical wisdom and practical wisdom,or general wisdom and wisdom of specific fields.However,the former kind of theories ignored the inner relationship between theoretical wisdom and practical wisdom.And the latter kind didn't realize that general wisdom and wisdom of specific fields could be understood as different application of the same concept of wisdom.I will argue that there is only one wisdom and it cannot be divided.In fact,wisdom consists in sets of provisional rules in fields where the highest principles are not certain.Life,in general,is the primary one of these fields.Therefore,we refer wisdom simpliciter as wisdom in life,and ‘living well' then becomes the appropriate epistemic aim for the process of wisdom simpliciter.Compared to wisdom of specific fields,when we talk about general wisdom,we focus on how to live sufficiently and evenly well through one's life.Whether dividing wisdom or not,all appropriate theories of wisdom must include conditions about belief.Most theories of wisdom presuppose the external epistemic object for wise people and treat such object as the core of the theory.One of the reasons to do so is that: we usually think that wisdom is superior to ordinary knowledge,and therefore,to be plausible,theories of wisdom must provide a special value for the ‘wisdom' it describes to be superior.Nevertheless,presupposing the external epistemic object will lead to three difficulties: 1.In reality,we attribute ‘wise' to people with different epistemic object.If a theory of wisdom only focuses on one special epistemic object,then it could not explain how people could be thought as wise by knowing other things.2.Presupposing that an external epistemic object provides wisdom,and relying on it to prove that those who know it have wisdom,would lead to circular reasoning.3.These theories justify people as being wise by showing that they have epistemic results corresponding to an external object.But wisdom defined in this way lacks the epistemic value specifically belonging to the epistemic process,and I contend that there should be a place for it in wisdom.To overcome these three difficulties,a theory of wisdom should avoid presupposing an external epistemic object,find the special value for wisdom from another source that could be objectively justified,and leave room for the exclusive epistemic value of the epistemic process.And I will propose a process theory of wisdom that is able to fulfil these tasks.A process theory focuses on the epistemic process of producing wisdom.We have seen that the primary subject of wisdom is ‘life',and ‘living well' is its appropriate aim.Hence,those epistemic results that help us to live sufficiently and evenly well through our life would be accepted as wisdom,and provide the special value that ‘wisdom' needs.Based on methodological individualism,we could: 1.Relying on one's subjective feeling to justify whether the results of an epistemic process could reliably make one live sufficiently and evenly well through one's life.2.If so,this epistemic process has achieved the aim,and thus it could produce wisdom.3.And therefore,the one who this epistemic process belongs to has wisdom.A process theory of wisdom doesn't need to presuppose the existence of external epistemic object for wisdom.Instead,our immediate experience provides the objectivity that we are looking for.And since what is to be justified and the way we justify it is not completely external to the epistemic results' producers themselves,the exclusive value of the epistemic process is also preserved.To conclude,a process theory of wisdom goes as the following:S is generally wise,if and only if: 1.With the aim of living well,through S's epistemic process,S is able to gain reliable belief about how to make one live sufficiently and evenly well through their life.2.S has the disposition to act,corresponding to that belief.And 3.that belief could reliably make those who practice them in ordinary situation feel that they live sufficiently and evenly well through their life.The process theory of wisdom is,by far,the most plausible theory about general wisdom.It could solve the difficulties faced by empirical studies and the theories presupposing the external epistemic object.After certain adjustment,it could also be applied to wisdom of specific fields.