| The topic of this dissertation is epistemic reasons. It covers issues in both meta- and normative epistemology, with noteworthy implications for current debates in ethics and action theory. It answers five basic questions. What kind of thing are reasons? Reasons are mental states. How does an ontological theory of reasons bear on more traditional issues in non-native epistemology? It bears in several ways on the debates between internalists and externalists, and on the debate among foundationalists, coherentists, and infinitists. What is it to believe something for a reason? You believe something for a reason just in case the reason non-deviantly causes your belief. Non-deviance, in turn, is explained in terms of the manifestation of character traits. What is the relationship between having a good reason to believe something and reasonably believing it, i.e., between propositional and doxastic justification? Reasonably believing something (doxastic justification) is conceptually prior to merely having good reason to believe it (propositional justification). What role might know-how play in a theory of propositional knowledge? Know-how provides foundationalists with an intuitive, principled, and comprehensive explanation of the non-doxastic sources of epistemic justification and knowledge. The resources of virtue epistemology are employed throughout. |
