Research On The Dynamic Compensation Mechanism Of Sponge City PPP Project Based On Public-private Game

In recent years,the state has actively promoted the sponge city project,but the promotion effect and construction result of sponge city project have not been satisfactory.The reason is that although the social benefits of the sponge city PPP project are significant,the attribute of quasi-operational PPP project make it difficult to protect the economic benefits of social capital,which affects their enthusiasm for building the sponge city project and the quality level of operating project.It is necessary and feasible for the government to provide corresponding economic compensation,which can attract social capital to invest in the sponge city project,and promote the construction of higher-quality the sponge city project.This paper relies on the construction status and operating characteristics of China's sponge city PPP project as the background.From the perspective of the government,through deep excavation of the principle of dynamic compensation mechanism,the government and social capital are included in the principal-agent theory framework.To maximize social benefits and protect the basic income of social capital is the starting point,and the government's compensation model is constructed based on the game perspective.Its purpose is to study how to design a dynamic compensation mechanism that is both stimulating and restrictive for protecting the right economic benefits of social capital in sponge city PPP project and stimulating its internal motivation.The dynamic compensation mechanism can also use limited financial compensation funds to maximize the government's leading role,promote the social benefits of the sponge city PPP project.Providing theoretical guidance for the government to formulate compensation policies to achieve the cooperative and all-win relationship between the public and private sector.This paper contains seven parts: Chapter 1 is the introduction,which mainly includes the research background,research purpose and significance of the paper,the current status of research on the sponge city PPP project at home and abroad,and the main research content of the paper;Chapter 2 is the basis for related theoretical research.This chapter mainly introduces the three theories of Stackelberge Game,principal-agent,and quasi-operational PPP projects.Chapter 3 introduces the basicsituation of sponge city project construction,management forms,etc.,and clarifies the background and information for providing compensation.Chapter 4 is a theoretical analysis of the dynamic compensation mechanism of the sponge city PPP project.It starts with the compensation principles,compensation targets,and compensation methods to establish the theoretical framework of the dynamic compensation mechanism.Chapter 5 is to establish an optimal dynamic compensation model based on the stable compensation of the sponge city PPP project during the operation phase,the performance reward and punishment that reflecting the performance level of the project and the principle of the government compensation.Using the backward induction method determine the optimal annual compensation amount that should be set to meet the government's maximum social benefits,based on the degree of effort of social capital to maximize its own benefits,and analyzing the internal relations of various factors that affect the social capital effort level and the amount of government compensation;Chapter 6 is empirical analysis.Combined with the actual case,set parameters,perform numerical analysis,further explain that the determination of compensation amount should be based on consideration of social capital capacity and risk,and put forward policy recommendations for the construction of the sponge city PPP project compensation mechanism;Chapter 7 proposes the deficiencies of the paper and the visions for the future.