A Game Model Based On The Independent Electricity Sale Company Monopolizing The Retail Market

In March 2015,a new round of power system reform was launched,and China actively promoted to establish competitive electricity wholesale market and retail market.It’s significant for building a competitive electricity market to introduce competition into power-generation side and electricity-sell side,complete and strengthen supervision to the power grid.In our country,the key and the path to deepen the reform of electric system reform is separating government and power enterprise,separating power station and power-grid company,advocating complementary separate,and promoting trade institutions relatively independent and standard operation.After the opening of the electricity selling markets,the power market will undergo a period of dynamic reconstruction,and the organizational mode and operation mechanism of the power industry will change.Based on the characteristics of the power market reform in developed countries,this paper expects that after the dynamic reconstruction of China’s power market,a relatively stable long-term model will emerge.This paper briefly summarizes the transaction environment,trading patterns and operation mechanism of electricity market after open the sell electricity side in developed countries,analyses the role definition and profit model of the main body in the power market.Thus we can obtain the behavior of the trading main body and the factors of the electricity price.Aiming at the dual roles of electricity purchasing in wholesale market and electricity selling in electricity selling market,a two-stage and two-mode bargaining game model is constructed.In the electricity selling market,independent electricity selling enterprises play games with each other.In the infinite repeated game process,folk theorem can guarantee that independent electricity selling enterprises collude with each other to monopolize the electricity selling market.In the stage game of infinite repeated games,there are two kinds of competition.One is Cournot game taking electric quantity as the competition condition,and the other is Bertrand game taking electricity price as the competition condition.In the wholesale market,colluding independent electricity selling enterprise consortium and power generation enterprises bargain with each other over the wholesale price.This paper respectively constructs the game models under two competitive conditions,and further describes the stage payment of electricity selling companies and power generation companies under the two games.The basic relationship is constructed through the Pareto optimality frontier.Then the bargaining model of collusive electricity selling companies and power generation companies is solved through Rubinstein bargaining game.The results show that under the stable long-term model,even when independent power selling enterprises collude to monopolize the power market,the monopoly retail market reached by the Bertrand game can still reduce the electricity price.Based on the equilibrium solution of the game model,through software simulation,we analyze the discount factors from the game main body itself characteristics and the constant factors from the policy and market environment characteristics.Then it provides policy suggestions for the regulation of electricity price in China’s electricity selling market from several aspects,including systemic operation scheduling,grid company efficiency,fuel factor input,demand response and bargaining power.