Research On R&D Game Of New Energy Automobile Industry Facing Endurance Ability

As China's economy enters a new normal,industrial development gradually changes from “quantity type” to “quality type”.The technological innovation of core products and key components is the key to the development of industry and the key to breakthrough.As one of China's strategic emerging industries,the new energy automobile industry has gradually strengthened its industrial innovation capability and has basically mastered the core technologies of new energy vehicles.However,the cruising range is still the main factor restricting the further development of the new energy automobile industry.It shows that the investment in independent technology research and development of new energy auto companies in China is insufficient.The main reason lies in the characteristics of “long cycle,high risk and high investment” for independent R&D.The cooperative research and development of downstream enterprises,and the research and development of new energy automobile manufacturers in the industry can effectively avoid risks and promote industrial development.Therefore,this paper comprehensively applies the theory of technological innovation management,industrial organization theory and game theory,and combines theoretical analysis and numerical simulation to study the research and development game of new energy automobile industry from the improvement of endurance.First of all,the paper considers the consumer's endurance demand for new energy vehicles and the innovation ability of enterprises,establishes a research and development game model including upstream and downstream enterprises of the new energy automobile industry chain,and compares the two research and development strategies of independent R&D and cooperative R&D.The results show that cooperative R&D can promote the improvement of the cruising range of new energy vehicles.We also introduce a R&D cost sharing mechanism and an industrial chain subsidy mechanism to achieve industrial chain coordination.Secondly,considering the fair concerns of the upstream battery manufacturers in the new energy automobile industry chain,the paper establishes a R&D game model of upstream and downstream enterprises in the industry chain that introduces fair concerns,and analyzes the impact of battery manufacturers' fairness concerns on R&D decisions.The results show that the fair concern of the business has harmed both interests,but increased the share of the battery manufacturer's profit in the industrial chain;the R&D cost sharing mechanism and the intra-industry subsidy mechanism can effectively improve the behavior of battery manufacturers' fair concerns.Then,considering the factors such as technology spillover level,new energy vehicle level difference and vertical difference,we establish a R&D game model of new energy automobile production enterprises,and analyze the R&D competition problem of duopoly enterprises in the new energy automobile industry.The results show that the increase of technology spillover level,the reduction of the differentiation of new energy vehicles and the cooperative and R&D are conducive to the improvement of the endurance of new energy vehicles.However,enterprises with less enthusiasm for cooperative R&D.Finally,the paper summarizes some conclusions,the policy recommendations and management implications for the new energy automobile industry are put forward,and the shortcomings of the research and the research direction of the next step are summarized.