Study On Free Rider Behavior In Construction Quality Incentive Problem

Quality incentives are an important means of improving project quality in construction management practice.After the owner provides the contractors with highquality level incentive contract,the contractors will choose higher quality level of construction behavior.This is very important to improve the overall quality level of the project.In some major construction projects in China,the number of interest entities involved in the project is large,the quality management organization of the project is complex,the quality standards are higher than the existing standards and industry norms,and new technologies,new equipment and new processes are widely used.This complexity of major construction projects has emerged as an alienated quality behavior,raising new questions for project quality management.This paper starts with the problems found in the actual investigation of major construction projects.Based on the game analysis and optimization theory,this paper studies how the alienated quality behavior of “free-riding” is generated under the current quality incentive mode of major construction projects.How the incentive scheme needs to be adjusted to avoid the emergence of “free-rider” behavior.The main work and contributions of this paper are the following aspects:First of all,through field research and literature review,summed up the experience of China’s major construction project quality management practices,as well as the emerging of alienation quality behaviors.From the national level to the construction site,major construction projects can be divided into three levels of management organization,five levels of quality acceptance,and a good quality incentive system.At the same time,major construction projects have also experienced various kinds of alienated quality behaviors in different engineering stages.In the quality evaluation section,a small number of contractors will only meet the qualified level of the quality of the subunit project,but enjoy the reward of high-quality incentive award by “free rider” behavior,because of the high-level construction quality of other contractors who cooperate with the construction.In the quality inspection and acceptance of concealed engineering projects,a small number of contractors cheating on workmanship and using adulterate materials,but because of the high quality level of cooperative contractors,through the acceptance of the quality of concealed works.The quality behavior of these two “free riders” poses a hidden danger to the overall quality of teamwork construction.Secondly,it studies the quality behavior of “free-riding” in the high-quality construction evaluation of major construction projects.According to the contractor’s "free rider" behavior selection theory under discrete conditions,the contractor’s quality incentive model is established under the situation that the owner has set up a staged quality incentive structure.This paper analyzes the game behavior choices of two contractors,compares the results of the three contractors’ game behaviors,and obtains the relationship between the construction behavior choices of N contractors and the quality incentive structure through incomplete induction.It is concluded that when the difference in the high-quality construction reward amount is greater than the difficulty cost coefficient of the contractor to improve the project quality,all contractor’s dominant decision-making action combination is to achieve the high-quality construction standards for the subunit construction.At this time,not only can the “free-riding” alienation quality behavior be avoided,but the overall benefit of teamwork can also reach the maximum.On this basis,the analysis of the example shows that the difference of the reward level of different grades of high-quality construction award is an important external factor that affects whether the contractor chooses the “free rider” behavior.Finally,the problem of “free-rider” quality behavior in the construction of concealed works of major projects was studied.According to the contractor’s "free rider" behavior selection theory under continuous conditions,the contractor’s actual input construction quantity is taken as the decision variable.Under the condition that the owner chooses the linear quality reward and punishment mechanism,the contractors’ optimal construction quantity input decision model is established.By comparing the contractor’s best input construction quantity to earn most revenue,and the team cooperation efficiency is the best,in which no one chooses the “free-riding” behavior of the contractor’s construction quantity input,and the quality behavior of the “free-rider” in the concealed project is obtained.The key factors for the formation are engineering quality acceptance criteria and penalty limits.Through the analysis of the example,on the one hand,this conclusion is verified,on the other hand,the influence of the parameter design of the linear quality reward and punishment scheme on the contractor’s actual engineering input is analyzed.