Earnings Management During The Mixed Ownership Reform Of State-owned Enterprises

The reform of mixed ownership has become the main breakthrough for the reform of state-owned enterprises.However,the existence of earnings management during the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises leads to the loss of state-owned assets,which led to the emergency braked of MBO and made Sasac stopping the performance incentives.The inefficiency of mixed ownership reform affects the process of mixed ownership reform.Therefore,it is of great practical significance to study earnings management in the process of mixing and improving the efficiency of mixing.The essence of mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises is the change of property right structure.This paper describes the reform of mixed ownership in state-owned enterprises from three aspects:the change of ownership structure,the composition of ownership and the nature of ownership subject.Based on property rights theory,agency theory,information asymmetry theory,tunnel theory,benefit synergy theory and incentive theory,analyzing the impact of the above three aspects on earnings management.The following conclusions are drawn from the case of"CGNNT" study:(1)Balanced ownership structure in mixed ownership reform can restrain earnings management.(2)In order to obtain the equity or even control of the listed companies,management has significant abnormal earnings management motivation and makes a low earnings,also,there are exceptional motives for selling shares but for making high earnings.(3)In Mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises,when the nature of property right changes from state-owned to private,the level of earnings management is significantly negative,while when the nature changes from private to state-owned,the level of earnings management is positive.On the basis of stable property rights,when the property rights are private the earnings management is higher than that when the property rights are state-owned.Based on the above research conclusions,starting from the limitation of earnings management during the reform of state-owned mixed ownership,in order to prevent the loss of state-owned assets and improve the efficiency of mixed reform,this paper puts forward the following suggestions:(1)Constructing the equity structure with checks and balances to improve the efficiency of governance.(2)In the process of mixed reform of state-owned enterprises,the shareholders should be selected to improve the equivalence of interests.When the management participates in the shares,the external forensic services and the regulatory agencies should be highly vigilant and increase the procedures to strengthen supervision.(3)During the mixed reform of state-owned enterprises,it is necessary to strengthen the supervision of transfer transactions when the nature of state-owned property rights is changed.Particularly,supervision is more important when the nature of property rights changes between state-owned and private.