| Emissions trading is an effective means of environmental governance,which can not only effectively control the emission of pollutants,protect the ecological environment,but also create certain economic benefits,and encourage enterprises to reduce emissions.The distribution of initial emission rights in the primary market is the basis of establishing emission trading system.The secondary market is mainly to realize the transfer of emission rights among enterprises,and is the redistribution process of emission rights.Compared with free distribution and price selling,auction has the characteristics of fairness and justice.It can control pollution at low cost through market trading of emission rights.With the diversification of emission trading demand and the diversity of market demand,theoretical research such as off-line auction of single emission right can not meet the development needs of the actual emission market.In order to adapt to the development of the times and meet the needs of many kinds of emission rights,this thesis proposes an online combined auction mechanism to support emission rights trading in the primary and secondary markets.The research contents and innovations of this thesis are as follows:Firstly,aimed at the primary market of emission trading,under the assumption that the emission enterprises arrive and leave the auction platform at any time,and submit a variety of combined demands of emission rights,a design model of online combined auction mechanism with multiple demands is constructed,a multi demand online combinatorial auction mechanism is proposed.The thesis proves that the mechanism satisfies incentive compatibility and individual rationality in theory.The experiment shows that compared with the effective allocation under complete information,the mechanism can achieve good results in many aspects,such as social welfare,the transaction rate of enterprise and the utilization rate of emission right,and when enterprises put forward a variety of emission right combination needs,the proposed mechanism can increase social welfare.Secondly,aimed at the secondary market of emission trading,an online combined double auction mechanism is designed.According to the market structure of "many to many" in double auction,this thesis describes the double auction problem in which multiple transferee and transferor of emission rights enter the auction platform at any time,the seller sells multiple emission rights,and the buyer submits a group of demand for emission rights combination,and constructs the design model of online combined double auction mechanism.On the basis of calculating unit social welfare,we make distribution decision,and use the idea of VCG to decide winner payment.The thesis proves that the mechanism satisfies incentive compatibility,individual rationality and budget balance in theory.Finally,an example verifies the effectiveness and feasibility of the mechanism. |
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