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Game Research On Self-Purification And Emission Reduction Of Duopoly Enterprises Under Cap-and-Trade Scheme

Posted on:2020-02-21Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:X Y LiangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2381330599954755Subject:Business Administration
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
With the introduction and implementation of carbon emission reduction policies,carbon emission reduction is not only related to corporate social responsibility,but also directly affects their profit.On the one hand,enterprises need to control carbon emissions to meet the goal of maximizing their revenue.On the other hand,consumers’ preference for green products also drives enterprises to actively seek effective ways to reduce carbon emissions.Carbon emission reduction policies directly changes the profit model of enterprises with emission control tasks,and ultimately affects their behavior.Most of the existing studies only consider the production decision-making of single enterprise,but the market is competitive,and the analysis of multiple enterprises can better reflect the real problems.In addition,the existing research regards green technology as a continuous decision-making,but through empirical research,it is found that the implementation decision of green technology is 0-1 decision-making,so the discrete analysis of green technology can better depict the practical problems faced by enterprises.Based on the Cap-and-Trade Scheme,and the actual data of Shenzhen Lexel Battery Co.,Ltd.,Shenzhen Grepow Battery Co.,Ltd.and Shenzhen carbon market,a mathematical duopoly game model is proposed,and the equilibrium conditions of complete information static game and complete information dynamic game are obtained by theoretical deduction.Because of the complexity of the real system,the theoretical model is simplified.In order to reflect the real problems more accurately,a computer simulation model is established on simulation software Arena to test the equilibrium conditions.In addition,three main factors including cost of green technology,carbon price and carbon quota are experimentally analyzed through simulation experiments.The following conclusions can be drawn:(1)the equilibrium conditions proved by theoretical analysis can provide advices for enterprise decision-making.(2)A simulation model is constructed by referring to the real system to verify that the theoretical equilibrium conditions are consistent with the simulation game equilibrium conditions.(3)The cost of green technology will affect the equilibrium.When the cost of green technology is too high,the profit of enterprises choosing to implement is lower than that of not,being a rational decision maker,enterprises will not choose to implement green technology.(4)Through the analysis of carbon price,it is found that when the carbon price increases to a certain extent,even if the cost of green technology is high,manufacturers will choose to implement green technology.It is also found that the cost of green technology acceptable to enterprises which is greener is higher.(5)Under the absolute quota allocation method,the change of quota has little effect on the game equilibrium,so the government should consider other allocation methods when designing policies.
Keywords/Search Tags:Cap-and-Trade, Carbon Emission Reduction, Duopoly Game
PDF Full Text Request
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