The Evolution Game Analysis Of Chemical Production Supervision Based On Prospect Theory

In recent years,chemical industry accidents happen frequently,causing great economic losses and casualties.Because chemical products are flammable,explosive and easily corroding,insecurity in behavior of the production process can easily lead to major safety accidents.Therefore,it is of great significance to consummate the supervision system and improve the supervision efficiency of chemical safety production for preventing chemical industry accidents.However,due to the information asymmetry and interest inconsistency between the subject and the object of regulation,the subject’s perception based on risk and value is the main factor that affects its chosen on behavior,which is also an important reason for the failure of regulation.At the same time,chemical accidents broke out in a flash and expands rapidly,because of which,the life and property safety of employees in chemical enterprises is threatened.In order to protect their own interests,employees will participate in the internal and external supervision of chemical production,which depends on their perception of chemical accident risk.Employees of the enterprise have full access to the production process of the enterprise.If employees participate in the supervision,a spontaneous supervision system can be formed inside the enterprise,which can solve the supervision failure caused by information asymmetry of the third-party supervision authorities and reduce the cost of the supervision authorities.In this paper,considering the characteristics above mentioned,focus on the current situation of frequent chemical production safety problems and lack of effective supervision,combined with the prospect theory,a perceptual payoff matrix which is different from the traditional payoff matrix is established based on the prospect theory.Firstly,the model is used to study the internal chemical production safety management behavior.By analyzing the evolution process of the supervision of unsafe behaviors among employees in enterprises,we can found 4 conditions that must be achieved to eliminate unsafe behaviors fundamentally.It also found 6 adjustment parameters can promote the system to reach the ideal state,which provides a theoretical basis for the formulation of reasonable and effective management regulations.Secondly,a tripartite dynamic evolutionary game system based on employee participation between government and enterprises is constructed to analyze the behavioral interaction mechanism of major stakeholders and the factors affecting the evolution result of the system.The results show that the coefficient of loss avoidance and the coefficient of risk attitude affect the strategy choice of the three parties in the game.The percentage of public participation in supervision has a significant impact on the regulatory authorities.The stable state of chemical enterprises is subject to the severity of punishment and the damage of accident causes.The enthusiasm of employees to participate in supervision is affected by their perceived potential risk of accident and the transmission coefficient.The influence process of key factors on the system evolution results is explored through simulation,which provides theoretical reference for improving the chemical safety production supervision system.