Research On Cooperative Innovation Between Manufacturers And Processors In E-waste Source Control

With the development of science and technology,the update speed of electronic products is accelerating,they bring vitality to the economy,but at the same time also produce a large number of electronic waste.Electronic waste is not only rich in such as gold,silver,and other precious metals,but also contains such as cadmium,mercury and other heavy metals.If not good treated,it not only can cause the pollution of environment,but also cause the waste of resources,which have serious impact on China’s advocated environment-friendly society.Therefore,how to consider reducing the pollution of electronic waste from the source of the design and production of electronic products,increasing the amount of resource recovery,realizing the recycle of resources,reducing the cost of dismantling has become a key concern of the whole society.In the past,most of the researches on the recycling of electronic waste are concerned with the recovery of the end of electronic waste,that is,how to choose the recycling channel and motivate the participants to improve the recycling of electronic waste to improve the utilization of resources and reduce pollution,But there are few studies to encourage producers to make green technology innovation to reduce the waste of resources and reduce the pollution of the environment.So,based on this,this paper starts with the cooperation and innovation of the manufacturer to encourage the producer to carry on the green technology innovation,and launches the following research:(1)The Evolutionary game analysis of cooperative innovation between producer and processor.The processor uses the method of innovating the cost subsidy to the producer to encourage the producer Green innovation,establishes the Evolution game model analysis,the result shows that the higher yield of the producer carries on the green technology innovation,the smaller of the cost,the producer will carry on the green technological innovation.The effect that the processor gives the producer cost subsidy to the producer’s choice is related to the different stages of the manufacturer’s green technology development,and to the processor,his choice of cooperative innovation decision depends on the manufacturer’s decision,and the more spillover effect of the cooperation innovation,the less of the cost subsidy,the more likely the processor is to collaborate with the manufacturer on green technology innovation.(2)The contract designed by the processor to motivate the manufacturer’s research and development.This chapter mainly studies how to design contracts to motivate producers to innovate in green technology,and analyze the problem of contract design under the condition of asymmetric information,the asymmetric information of green research and development efforts and the asymmetric information in green research and development efforts.(3)The Government’s game analysis on the evolution of regulatory cooperation between producers and suppliers.This chapter studies the government through to the manufacturer does not according to the contract stipulation to the supplier’s innovation cost subsidy to the green technology research and development,establishes the punishment mechanism to supervise,establishes the evolution game model,the result shows to the government,the less of the supervision cost,the more of the social benefit and the environmental benefit,the less likely the manufacturer chooses to invest in green technology research and development,the more the government will choose to be strictly regulated;for manufacturers,the higher the yield of research and development,the greater of the government supervision and punishment,the higher the probability that producers will choose to invest in green technology research and development according to the contract.