The Research On Coal Mine Flood Hazards Crisis Management Based On Dynamic Game

In recent years,with the foundation and improvement of the vertical management system for the national safety production supervision agencies,the coal mine safety production capability in China is increasing gradually.However,compared with the international advanced level,the general level of the coal mine safety production in our nation is still low,the catastrophe incident in coal mine industry happens frequently.As to the reasons of the incidents,the happening of coal mine flood hazards is not only related with the special regional geological conditions in our country,but also restricted to the enterprise internal management,what is more,there are more external multiple factors contributing to the incidents,especially the complex interest-related parties in coal mine industry and the complex interest relationship,which gravely influence the effective prevention and management of the coal mine flood hazards in our country.Therefore,to make the interest-related parties be satisfied becomes the core of the effective prevention and management of the coal mine flood hazards.In the light of the above practical problem,this paper adapts the dynamic game model,makes research on the dynamic game behavior among the interest-related coal mine enterprises,the supervision agencies and the government,finds out the interest relationships,puts forward the model hypothesis and then determines the key decision variables,founds the basic game model,makes quantified analysis of the interest relationships among the three parties,and then makes empirical research,analyzes the influence of the game party payoff function and the decision variables onthe coal mines' safety input then on the effective prevention and management of coalmine flood hazards.The main content of this paper:(1)through the analysis of internal and externalinfluential factors in coal mine flood hazards crisis management,combined with thenatural cycle division of coal mine flood hazards,analyzes the interest-related partiesin the three stages in coal mine flood hazards crisis management.Introduces thegovernment supervision as the supervision body beyond the supervision agencies into the coal mine flood hazards crisis management system,analyzes the intricate relationships among them and its influence in detail;(2)quantifies the key interest index of the model interest-related parties,puts forward the model hypothesis and then determines the decision variables,founds the dynamic game model of coal mine enterprises-supervision agencies-the government and then solves and analyzes.Compared with the achievements in the prevention and management of coal mine flood hazards,introduces the dynamic game theory in the this issue,focuses on the change and coordination of the dynamic interests of the main interest-related party in coal mine flood hazards crisis management;(3)Makes empirical research on some typical coal mine flood hazards crisis management,determines the key payoff function and decision variables,founds dynamic game model and solves,analyzes the influence of the game-body's key payoff function and decision variables value on the coal mine enterprises' safety input on the prevention and management on coal mine flood hazards,provides dependable decision methods and data support for the coal mine flood hazards crisis management in our country.Theory and empirical research shows:only makes clear the interest relationships among the main interest-related parties:coal mine enterprises,supervision agencies,the government,in coal mine flood hazards crisis management and finds out the methods of effective decision,can the interests among the parties be better coordinated,and maximize their own long-term interests and global interests.